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Bank stability and market discipline: The effect of contingent capital on risk taking and default probability

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  • Jens Hilscher

    () (International Business School, Brandeis University)

  • Alon Raviv

    () (International Business School, Brandeis University)

Abstract

This paper investigates the e¤ects of ?nancial institutions issuing contingent capital, a debt security that automatically converts into equity if assets fall below a predetermined threshold. We decompose bank liabilities into sets of barrier op- tions and present closed-form solutions for their prices. We quantify the reduction in default probability associated with issuing contingent capital instead of subor- dinated debt. We then show that appropriate choice of contingent capital terms (in particular the conversion ratio) can virtually eliminate stockholders?incentives to risk-shift, a motivation that is present when bank liabilities instead include ei- ther subordinated debt or additional equity. Importantly, risk-taking incentives continue to be weak during times of ?nancial distress. Our ?ndings imply that contingent capital may be an e¤ective tool for stabilizing ?nancial institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Jens Hilscher & Alon Raviv, 2012. "Bank stability and market discipline: The effect of contingent capital on risk taking and default probability," Working Papers 53, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Businesss School, revised Jan 2014.
  • Handle: RePEc:brd:wpaper:53
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    File URL: http://www.brandeis.edu/economics/RePEc/brd/doc/Brandeis_WP53R.pdf
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    File URL: http://www.brandeis.edu/economics/RePEc/brd/doc/Brandeis_WP53.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kiewiet, Gera & van Lelyveld, Iman Paul Pieter & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 2017. "Contingent Convertibles: Can the Market handle them?," CEPR Discussion Papers 12359, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Gupta, Anshul & Akuzawa, Toshinao & Nishiyama, Yoshihiko, 2013. "Quantitative evaluation of contingent capital and its applications," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 457-486.
    3. Kenjiro Hori & Jorge Martin Cerón, 2017. "Contingent Convertible Bonds: Payoff Structures and Incentive Effects," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 1711, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    4. Natalya Martynova & Enrico Perotti, 2012. "Convertible Bonds and Bank Risk-Taking," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-106/IV/DSF41, Tinbergen Institute, revised 10 Oct 2016.
    5. Chan, Stephanie & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 2016. "CoCo Design, Risk Shifting and Financial Fragility," CEPR Discussion Papers 11099, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. repec:eee:reveco:v:51:y:2017:i:c:p:354-369 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Yang, Zhaojun & Zhao, Zhiming, 2015. "Valuation and analysis of contingent convertible securities with jump risk," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 124-135.
    8. Stefan Avdjiev & Bilyana Bogdanova & Patrick Bolton & Wei Jiang & Anastasia Kartasheva, 2017. "CoCo Issuance and Bank Fragility," NBER Working Papers 23999, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Kenjiro Hori & Jorge Martin Ceron, 2016. "Removing Moral Hazard and Agency Costs in Banks: Beyond CoCo Bonds," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 1603, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    10. Jaworski, Piotr & Liberadzki, Kamil & Liberadzki, Marcin, 2017. "How does issuing contingent convertible bonds improve bank's solvency? A Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 162-168.
    11. Stephanie Chan & Sweder van Wijnbergen, 2014. "Cocos, Contagion and Systemic Risk," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-110/VI/DSF79, Tinbergen Institute, revised 29 Oct 2014.
    12. Chan, Stephanie & Wijnbergen, Sweder, 2017. "CoCo Design, Risk Shifting Incentives and Financial Fragility," ECMI Papers 12166, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    13. Bleich, Dirk, 2014. "Contingent convertible bonds and the stability of bank funding: The case of partial writedown," Discussion Papers 28/2014, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    14. Lo, Chien-Ling & Lee, Jin-Ping & Yu, Min-Teh, 2013. "Valuation of insurers’ contingent capital with counterparty risk and price endogeneity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5025-5035.
    15. Berg, Tobias & Kaserer, Christoph, 2015. "Does contingent capital induce excessive risk-taking?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 356-385.
    16. Tan, Yingxian & Yang, Zhaojun, 2016. "Contingent capital, capital structure and investment," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 56-73.
    17. Mamatzakis, Emmanuel & Zhang, Xiaoxiang & Wang, Chaoke, 2017. "How the corporate governance mechanisms affect bank risk taking," MPRA Paper 78137, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Attaoui, Sami & Poncet, Patrice, 2015. "Write-Down Bonds and Capital and Debt Structures," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 97-119.
    19. Martijn A. Boermans & Sweder van Wijnbergen, 2018. "Contingent convertible bonds: Who invests in European CoCos?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(4), pages 234-238, February.
    20. Allen, Linda & Tang, Yi, 2016. "What’s the contingency? A proposal for bank contingent capital triggered by systemic risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 1-14.
    21. Stig Helberg & Snorre Lindset, 2013. "Bank Debt Regulations Implications for Bank Capital and Bond Risk," Working Paper Series 14813, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
    22. Stephanie Chan & Sweder van Wijnbergen, 2016. "Coco Design, Risk Shifting Incentives and Capital Regulation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-007/VI, Tinbergen Institute, revised 13 Nov 2017.
    23. Goncharenko, Roman & Ongena, Steven & Rauf, Asad, 2017. "The agency of CoCo: Why do banks issue contingent convertible bonds?," CFS Working Paper Series 586, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    24. repec:eee:revfin:v:34:y:2017:i:c:p:10-32 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    contingent capital; executive compensation; risk taking; banking regulation; bank default probability; ?financial crisis;

    JEL classification:

    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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