Contingent Capital: The Case for COERCs
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References listed on IDEAS
- Scott, Hal S. (ed.), 2005. "Capital Adequacy beyond Basel: Banking, Securities, and Insurance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195169713.
- Hillion, Pierre & Vermaelen, Theo, 2004. "Death spiral convertibles," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 381-415, February.
- Alon Raviv, 2004. "Bank Stability and Market Discipline: Debt-for-Equity Swap versus Subordinated Notes," Finance 0408003, EconWPA.
- John B. Taylor, 2016. "National and International Monetary Reform," Book Chapters,in: George P. Shultz (ed.), Blueprint for America, chapter 6 Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
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KeywordsBanks; Financial crisis; Financial stability; Security design;
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
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