A Contractual Approach to Restructuring Financial Institutions
In: Ending Government Bailouts As We Know Them
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Cited by:
- Viral V. Acharya & Hamid Mehran & Anjan V. Thakor, 2016.
"Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There Is Rent Seeking and Risk Shifting,"
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(1), pages 36-75.
- Viral V. Acharya & Hamid Mehran & Anjan V. Thakor, 2010. "Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating bank leverage when there is rent seeking and risk shifting," Staff Reports 469, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Viral V. Acharya & Hamid Mehran & Anjan V. Thakor, 2010. "Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating bank leverage when there is rent seeking and risk shifting," Working Papers (Old Series) 1024, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Thakor, Anjan & Acharya, Viral & Mehran, Hamid, 2012. "Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating bank leverage when there is rent-seeking and risk-shifting," CEPR Discussion Papers 8822, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pennacchi, George & Vermaelen, Theo & Wolff, Christian C. P., 2014.
"Contingent Capital: The Case of COERCs,"
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 541-574, June.
- Wolff, Christian & Pennacch, George G., 2010. "Contingent Capital: The Case for COERCs," CEPR Discussion Papers 8028, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Christian Wolff & Theo Vermaelen & George Pennacchi, 2010. "Contingent Capital: The Case for COERCs," LSF Research Working Paper Series 10-08, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
- Nan Chen & Paul Glasserman & Behzad Nouri & Markus Pelger, 2013. "CoCos, Bail-In, and Tail Risk," Working Papers 13-01, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
- Berg, Tobias & Kaserer, Christoph, 2015.
"Does contingent capital induce excessive risk-taking?,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 356-385.
- Berg, Tobias & Kaserer, Christoph, 2015. "Does contingent capital induce excessive risk-taking?," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 488, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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