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The ECB after the crisis: existing synergies among monetary policy, macroprudential policies and banking supervision

Author

Listed:
  • Cassola, Nuno
  • Kok, Christoffer
  • Mongelli, Francesco Paolo

Abstract

The prolonged crisis exposed the vulnerability of a monetary union without a banking union. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which started operating in November 2014, is an essential step towards restoring banks to health and rebuilding trust in the banking system. The ECB is today responsible for setting a single monetary policy applicable throughout the euro area and for supervising all euro area banks in order to ensure their safety and soundness, some directly and some indirectly. Its role in the area of financial stability has also expanded through the conferral of macroprudential tasks and tools that include tightening national measures when necessary. It thus carries out these complementary functions, while its primary objective of pursuing price stability remains unchanged. What are the working arrangements of this enlarged ECB, and what are the similarities and existing synergies among these functions? In the following pages, focusing on the organisational implications of the “new” ECB, we show the relative degrees of centralisation and decentralisation that exist in discharging these functions, the cycles of policy preparation and the rules governing interaction between them. JEL Classification: E42, E58, F36, G21

Suggested Citation

  • Cassola, Nuno & Kok, Christoffer & Mongelli, Francesco Paolo, 2019. "The ECB after the crisis: existing synergies among monetary policy, macroprudential policies and banking supervision," Occasional Paper Series 237, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbops:2019237
    Note: 334845
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking supervision; banking union; decision-making process; European Central Bank; financial stability; macroprudential policies; monetary policy; systemic risks;

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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