IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbfina/v53y2015icp266-277.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Basel III leverage ratio requirement and the probability of bank runs

Author

Listed:
  • Dermine, Jean

Abstract

A new argument for the Basel III leverage ratio requirement is proposed: the need to limit the risk of a bank run when there is imperfect information on the value of a bank’s assets. In addition to screening and monitoring borrowers, banks provide liquidity insurance with the supply of short-term deposits withdrawable on demand. The maturity mismatch creates the risk of a disorderly bank run which can be exacerbated by imperfect information about the value of bank assets. It is shown in a stylized Basel III framework that capital regulation should incorporate a liquidity risk component. Credit risk diversification and/or a reduced probability of loan default which lead to a reduction of Basel III regulatory capital will increase the probability of a bank run. The leverage ratio rule puts a floor on the Basel III risk-weighted capital ratio, allowing the limitation of such a risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Dermine, Jean, 2015. "Basel III leverage ratio requirement and the probability of bank runs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 266-277.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:53:y:2015:i:c:p:266-277
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.12.007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426614003884
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.12.007?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Laeven, Luc & Majnoni, Giovanni, 2003. "Loan loss provisioning and economic slowdowns: too much, too late?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 178-197, April.
    2. Mark J. Flannery & Kasturi P. Rangan, 2002. "Market forces at work in the banking industry: evidence from the capital buildup of the 1990s," Proceedings 904, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    3. Postlewaite, Andrew & Vives, Xavier, 1987. "Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 485-491, June.
    4. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    5. Andrew G. Haldane & Vasileios Madouros, 2012. "The dog and the frisbee," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 109-159.
    6. Michael S. Gibson, 2004. "Understanding the risk of synthetic CDOs," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-36, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    7. Klaus Düllmann & Nancy Masschelein, 2007. "A Tractable Model to Measure Sector Concentration Risk in Credit Portfolios," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 32(1), pages 55-79, October.
    8. Viral V. Acharya & Iftekhar Hasan & Anthony Saunders, 2006. "Should Banks Be Diversified? Evidence from Individual Bank Loan Portfolios," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(3), pages 1355-1412, May.
    9. Gordy, Michael B., 2003. "A risk-factor model foundation for ratings-based bank capital rules," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 199-232, July.
    10. Clovis Rugemintwari, 2011. "The Leverage Ratio as a Bank Discipline Device," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 62(3), pages 479-490.
    11. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas, 2000. "Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and Financial Market Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 324-351, April.
    12. Sanjiv R. Das & Darrell Duffie & Nikunj Kapadia & Leandro Saita, 2007. "Common Failings: How Corporate Defaults Are Correlated," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 93-117, February.
    13. Dermine, Jean & Lajeri, Fatma, 2001. "Credit risk and the deposit insurance premium: a note," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(5), pages 497-508.
    14. Merton, Robert C, 1974. "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 29(2), pages 449-470, May.
    15. Gary Gorton, 2013. "The Development of Opacity in U.S. Banking," NBER Working Papers 19540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Kiema, Ilkka & Jokivuolle, Esa, 2014. "Does a leverage ratio requirement increase bank stability?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 240-254.
    17. Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 2004. "Loan pricing under Basel capital requirements," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 496-521, October.
    18. Gorton, Gary & Pennacchi, George, 1990. "Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 49-71, March.
    19. Gechun Liang & Eva Lutkebohmert & Wei Wei, 2012. "Funding Liquidity, Debt Tenor Structure, and Creditor's Belief: An Exogenous Dynamic Debt Run Model," Papers 1209.3513, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2015.
    20. Blum, Jürg M., 2008. "Why 'Basel II' may need a leverage ratio restriction," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1699-1707, August.
    21. Daniel Covitz & Nellie Liang & Gustavo A. Suarez, 2013. "The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Collapse of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(3), pages 815-848, June.
    22. Jacklin, Charles J & Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1988. "Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 568-592, June.
    23. Itay Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, 2005. "Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1293-1327, June.
    24. Boyd, John H. & Runkle, David E., 1993. "Size and performance of banking firms : Testing the predictions of theory," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 47-67, February.
    25. Chen, Andrew H. & Ju, Nengjiu & Mazumdar, Sumon C. & Verma, Avinash, 2006. "Correlated Default Risks and Bank Regulations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(2), pages 375-398, March.
    26. Bryant, John, 1980. "A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-344, December.
    27. Flannery, Mark J., 1989. "Capital regulation and insured banks choice of individual loan default risks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 235-258, September.
    28. Jeffery D Amato & Jacob Gyntelberg, 2005. "CDS index tranches and the pricing of credit risk correlations," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, March.
    29. Donald P. Morgan, 2002. "Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 874-888, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zhiguo He & Wei Xiong, 2012. "Dynamic Debt Runs," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(6), pages 1799-1843.
    2. Kristian Blickle & Markus Brunnermeier & Stephan Luck, 2020. "Micro-evidence from a System-wide Financial Meltdown: The German Crisis of 1931," Working Papers 275, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    3. Ahnert, Toni & Martinez-Miera, David, 2021. "Bank Runs, Bank Competition and Opacity," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242348, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Oehmke, Martin, 2013. "Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1221-1288, Elsevier.
    5. Peleg Lazar, Sharon & Raviv, Alon, 2019. "The risk spiral: The effects of bank capital and diversification on risk taking," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    6. Rajkamal Iyer & Thais Jensen, & Niels Johannesen & Adam Sheridan, 2016. "The Run for Safety: Financial Fragility and Deposit Insurance," EPRU Working Paper Series 1602, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    7. Chatterji, Shurojit; Ghosal, Sayantan, 2010. "Liquidity, moral hazard and bank crises," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 27, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    8. Chatterji, S. & Ghosal, S., 2008. "Moral hazard, bank runs and contagion," Economic Research Papers 269785, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    9. Dunhong Jin & Marcin Kacperczyk & Bige Kahraman & Felix Suntheim, 2022. "Swing Pricing and Fragility in Open-End Mutual Funds," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(1), pages 1-50.
    10. John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler, 1993. "US Commercial Banking: Trends, Cycles, and Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1993, Volume 8, pages 319-377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Xavier Vives, 2014. "Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(12), pages 3547-3592.
    12. Gorton, Gary & Winton, Andrew, 2003. "Financial intermediation," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 431-552, Elsevier.
    13. Assaf Razin & Itay Goldstein, 2012. "Review Of Theories of Financial Crises," 2012 Meeting Papers 214, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Goldstein, Itay & Razin, Assaf, 2015. "Three Branches of Theories of Financial Crises," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 10(2), pages 113-180, 30.
    15. Roy Havemann, 2018. "Can creditor bail-in trigger contagion? The experience of an emerging market," Working Papers 755, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    16. Kristian Blickle & Markus K. Brunnermeier & Stephan Luck, 2022. "Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail?," NBER Working Papers 29753, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Xavier Vives, 2011. "Competition and Stability in Banking," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia (ed.),Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, edition 1, volume 16, chapter 12, pages 455-502, Central Bank of Chile.
    18. Molyneux, Philip & Upreti, Vineet & Zhou, Tim, 2023. "Depositor market discipline: New evidence from selling failed banks," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    19. Chen, Yi & Du, Kai, 2020. "The role of information disclosure in financial intermediation with investment risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 46(C).
    20. Rajkamal Iyer & Manju Puri, 2012. "Understanding Bank Runs: The Importance of Depositor-Bank Relationships and Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1414-1445, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank regulation; Basel capital; Leverage ratio; Credit risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:53:y:2015:i:c:p:266-277. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.