Does a leverage ratio requirement increase bank stability?
Basel III has introduced a non-risk-weighted leverage ratio requirement (LRR) which complements the internal ratings based (IRB) capital requirements. It provides a backstop against model risk which arises if some loans get incorrectly rated and become toxic. We study the effects of the LRR on lending strategies and its implications for banks’ stability. We show that the LRR might induce banks with low-risk lending strategies to diversify their portfolios into high-risk loans until the LRR is no longer the binding capital constraint on them. If the LRR is lower than the average bank’s IRB requirement, the aggregate capital costs of banks do not increase. However, because the diversification makes banks’ portfolios more alike the banking sector as a whole may become more exposed to model risk in each loan category. This may undermine banking sector stability. On balance, our calibrated model motivates a significantly higher LRR than the current one.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 2004.
"Loan pricing under Basel capital requirements,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 496-521, October.
- Gordy, Michael B., 2000.
"A comparative anatomy of credit risk models,"
Journal of Banking & Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 119-149, January.
- Acharya, Viral V. & Schnabl, Philipp & Suarez, Gustavo, 2013.
"Securitization without risk transfer,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 515-536.
- Acharya, Viral V & Schnabl, Philipp & Suarez, Gustavo, 2012. "Securitization Without Risk Transfer," CEPR Discussion Papers 8769, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Viral V. Acharya & Philipp Schnabl & Gustavo Suarez, 2010. "Securitization without risk transfer," NBER Working Papers 15730, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gennaioli, Nicola & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2012.
"Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility,"
10886835, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Gennaioli, Nicola & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2012. "Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 452-468.
- Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2010. "Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility," Working Papers 502, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2010. "Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility," NBER Working Papers 16068, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2010. "Neglected risks, financial innovation and financial fragility," Economics Working Papers 1251, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2010.
- Samuel G. Hanson & Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 2011. "A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
- Blum, Jürg M., 2008. "Why 'Basel II' may need a leverage ratio restriction," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1699-1707, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:39:y:2014:i:c:p:240-254. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.