IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinin/v48y2021ics1042957320300371.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Capital requirements and mortgage pricing: Evidence from Basel II

Author

Listed:
  • Benetton, Matteo
  • Eckley, Peter
  • Garbarino, Nicola
  • Kirwin, Liam
  • Latsi, Georgia

Abstract

As a result of the Basel II reforms, capital requirements on UK mortgages fell substantially in coincidence with the financial crisis. We exploit a novel, loan-level dataset on within-lender variation in risk-weighted capital requirements and a triple-difference identification strategy to estimate the pass through of capital requirements to mortgage rates. We find that a 1pp lower risk-weighted capital requirement leads to a reduction in rates by 10–16bp on average, with stronger effects for less-capitalized lenders. The competitive advantage induced by multi-tier regulation also affects the composition of banks mortgage portfolios, with larger lenders specializing in lower risk loans. Finally, our results support the use of countercyclical capital requirements to sustain lending in a crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Benetton, Matteo & Eckley, Peter & Garbarino, Nicola & Kirwin, Liam & Latsi, Georgia, 2021. "Capital requirements and mortgage pricing: Evidence from Basel II," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:48:y:2021:i:c:s1042957320300371
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100883
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957320300371
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100883?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bertrand Rime, 2005. "Will Basel II Lead to a Specialization of Unsophisticated Banks on High‐Risk Borrowers?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 29-55, March.
    2. Michael Carlos Best & James S Cloyne & Ethan Ilzetzki & Henrik J Kleven, 2020. "Estimating the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution Using Mortgage Notches," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(2), pages 656-690.
    3. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2011. "Bank size and risk-taking under Basel II," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1436-1449, June.
    4. Paul Calem & James Follain, 2007. "Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and the Potential Competitive Impact of Basel II in the Market for Residential Mortgages," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 197-219, August.
    5. Soren T. Anderson & James M. Sallee, 2011. "Using Loopholes to Reveal the Marginal Cost of Regulation: The Case of Fuel-Economy Standards," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1375-1409, June.
    6. Rajan, Uday & Seru, Amit & Vig, Vikrant, 2015. "The failure of models that predict failure: Distance, incentives, and defaults," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 237-260.
    7. Gabriel Jiménez & Steven Ongena & José-Luis Peydró & Jesús Saurina, 2017. "Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers, and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(6), pages 2126-2177.
    8. Francis, William B. & Osborne, Matthew, 2012. "Capital requirements and bank behavior in the UK: Are there lessons for international capital standards?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 803-816.
    9. David Miles & Jing Yang & Gilberto Marcheggiano, 2013. "Optimal Bank Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(567), pages 1-37, March.
    10. Amiyatosh Purnanandam, 2011. "Originate-to-distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(6), pages 1881-1915.
    11. Timothy Besley & Neil Meads & Paolo Surico, 2013. "Risk Heterogeneity and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Mortgage Market," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 375-419.
    12. John Y. Campbell & Tarun Ramadorai & Benjamin Ranish, 2015. "The Impact of Regulation on Mortgage Risk: Evidence from India," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 71-102, November.
    13. Pennacchi, George G. & Santos, João A.C., 2021. "Why do banks target ROE?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    14. Markus Behn & Rainer Haselmann & Vikrant Vig, 2022. "The Limits of Model‐Based Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 1635-1684, June.
    15. Markus Behn & Rainer Haselmann & Paul Wachtel, 2016. "Procyclical Capital Regulation and Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(2), pages 919-956, April.
    16. Òscar Jordà & Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, 2016. "The great mortgaging: housing finance, crises and business cycles," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 31(85), pages 107-152.
    17. Acharya, Viral V. & Steffen, Sascha, 2015. "The “greatest” carry trade ever? Understanding eurozone bank risks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 215-236.
    18. Ruthenberg, David & Landskroner, Yoram, 2008. "Loan pricing under Basel II in an imperfectly competitive banking market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(12), pages 2725-2733, December.
    19. repec:oup:restud:v:84:y::i:1:p:45-81. is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Ivashina, Victoria & Scharfstein, David, 2010. "Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 319-338, September.
    21. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    22. Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 2004. "Loan pricing under Basel capital requirements," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 496-521, October.
    23. Benjamin J. Keys & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2012. "Lender Screening and the Role of Securitization: Evidence from Prime and Subprime Mortgage Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(7), pages 2071-2108.
    24. Reint Gropp & Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2011. "Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(6), pages 2084-2120.
    25. Martin Brooke & Oliver Bush & Robert Edwards & Jas Ellis & Bill Francis & Rashmi Harimohan & Katharine Neiss & Caspar Siegert, 2015. "Financial Stability Paper No. 35: Measuring the macroeconomic costs and benefits of higher UK bank capital requirements -," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 35, Bank of England.
    26. Acharya, Viral V. & Schnabl, Philipp & Suarez, Gustavo, 2013. "Securitization without risk transfer," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 515-536.
    27. Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 651-666.
    28. Greg Kaplan & Giovanni L. Violante, 2014. "A Model of the Consumption Response to Fiscal Stimulus Payments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(4), pages 1199-1239, July.
    29. Belkhir, Mohamed & Ben Naceur, Sami & Chami, Ralph & Samet, Anis, 2021. "Bank capital and the cost of equity," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    30. Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362.
    31. Gambacorta, Leonardo, 2008. "How do banks set interest rates?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(5), pages 792-819, July.
    32. Matthew C Plosser & João A C Santos, 2018. "Banks’ Incentives and Inconsistent Risk Models," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(6), pages 2080-2112.
    33. Shekhar Aiyar, 2012. "From Financial Crisis to Great Recession: The Role of Globalized Banks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 225-230, May.
    34. Roni Kisin & Asaf Manela, 2016. "The Shadow Cost of Bank Capital Requirements," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(7), pages 1780-1820.
    35. Jonathan Bridges & David Gregory & Mette Nielsen & Silvia Pezzini & Amar Radia & Marco Spaltro, 2014. "The impact of capital requirements on bank lending," Bank of England working papers 486, Bank of England.
    36. Rashmi Harimohan & Michael McLeay & Garry Young, 2016. "Pass-through of bank funding costs to lending and deposit rates: lessons from the financial crisis," Bank of England working papers 590, Bank of England.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Benbouzid, Nadia & Kumar, Abhishek & Mallick, Sushanta K. & Sousa, Ricardo M. & Stojanovic, Aleksandar, 2022. "Bank credit risk and macro-prudential policies: Role of counter-cyclical capital buffer," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    2. Viral V. Acharya & Katharina Bergant & Matteo Crosignani & Tim Eisert & Fergal Mccann, 2022. "The Anatomy of the Transmission of Macroprudential Policies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(5), pages 2533-2575, October.
    3. Saha, Asish & Rooj, Debasis & Sengupta, Reshmi, 2023. "Macroprudential Policy and mortgage leverage decisions—Evidence from micro data," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1430-1444.
    4. Kabundi, Alain & De Simone, Francisco Nadal, 2022. "Euro area banking and monetary policy shocks in the QE era," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    5. Cristina Jude & Grégory Levieuge, 2024. "Doubling Down: The Synergy of CCyB Release and Monetary Policy Easing," Working papers 961, Banque de France.
    6. Marcus Buckmann & Buckmann Eccles, 2025. "The effect of mortgage brokers on banks’ business models," Bank of England working papers 1104, Bank of England.
    7. Nam, Rachel J., 2022. "Open banking and customer data sharing: Implications for FinTech borrowers," SAFE Working Paper Series 364, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    8. Donat Kim & Eszter Raciborski & Balint Vargedo, 2024. "Experiences from the MNB's Green Preferential Capital Requirement Programme and the Extension of the Programme," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 23(3), pages 193-209.
    9. Jude, Cristina & Levieuge, Grégory, 2025. "Doubling down: The synergy of CCyB release and monetary policy easing," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    10. Damen, Sven & Schildermans, Stef, 2022. "Capital requirements, mortgage rates and house prices," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    11. Sylwia Klus & Artur Stefanski & Zuzanna Urbanowicz & Leszek Wanat, 2024. "Capital Adequacy Standards on the Case of Selected Banks in Poland Under Economic Uncertainty," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(2), pages 517-530.
    12. Song, Fenghua & Thakor, Anjan, 2022. "Ethics, capital and talent competition in banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Peter Eckley & Matteo Benetton & Georgia Latsi & Nicola Garbarino & Liam Kirwin, 2017. "Specialisation in mortgage risk under Basel II," Bank of England working papers 639, Bank of England.
    2. Dal Borgo, Mariela, 2022. "Internal models for deposits: Effects on banks' capital and interest rate risk of assets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    3. Matteo Benetton, 2021. "Leverage Regulation and Market Structure: A Structural Model of the U.K. Mortgage Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(6), pages 2997-3053, December.
    4. Nobel Prize Committee, 2022. "Financial Intermediation and the Economy," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2022-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    5. Saleem Bahaj & Frederic Malherbe, 2020. "The Forced Safety Effect: How Higher Capital Requirements Can Increase Bank Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(6), pages 3013-3053, December.
    6. Björn Imbierowicz & Jonas Kragh & Jesper Rangvid, 2018. "Time‐Varying Capital Requirements and Disclosure Rules: Effects on Capitalization and Lending Decisions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 573-602, June.
    7. David Glancy & Robert Kurtzman, 2022. "How Do Capital Requirements Affect Loan Rates? Evidence from High Volatility Commercial Real Estate," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 11(1), pages 88-127.
    8. José María Liberti & Mitchell A. Petersen, 2018. "Information: Hard and Soft," NBER Working Papers 25075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Fiordelisi, Franco & Fusi, Giulia & Maddaloni, Angela & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2022. "Pandemic lending: micro and macro effects of model-based regulation," Working Paper Series 2760, European Central Bank.
    10. Chen, Zhizhen & Liu, Frank Hong & Opong, Kwaku & Zhou, Mingming, 2017. "Short-term safety or long-term failure? Empirical evidence of the impact of securitization on bank risk," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 48-74.
    11. Abdullah Yavas & Shuang Zhu, 2024. "Misreporting of second liens in portfolio mortgages and privately securitized mortgages," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 52(1), pages 73-109, January.
    12. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2019_004 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. de-Ramon, Sebastian J.A. & Francis, William B. & Harris, Qun, 2022. "Bank-specific capital requirements and capital management from 1989-2013: Further evidence from the UK," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    14. Abbassi, Puriya & Schmidt, Michael, 2018. "A comprehensive view on risk reporting: Evidence from supervisory data," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 74-85.
    15. David Aikman & Andrew Haldane & Marc Hinterschweiger & Sujit Kapadia, 2018. "Rethinking financial stability," Bank of England working papers 712, Bank of England.
    16. Fišera, Boris & Horváth, Roman & Melecký, Martin, 2025. "The effect of basel III implementation on SME access to financing in emerging markets and developing economies," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    17. Tuuli, Saara, 2019. "Model-based regulation and firms' access to finance," Research Discussion Papers 4/2019, Bank of Finland.
    18. Xiangming Fang & David Jutrsa & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria & Mr. Andrea F Presbitero & Mr. Lev Ratnovski & Mr. Felix J Vardy, 2018. "The Effects of Higher Bank Capital Requirements on Credit in Peru," IMF Working Papers 2018/222, International Monetary Fund.
    19. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2011. "Bank size and risk-taking under Basel II," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1436-1449, June.
    20. Björn Imbierowicz & Axel Löffler & Ursula Vogel, 2021. "The transmission of bank capital requirements and monetary policy to bank lending in Germany," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 144-164, February.
    21. Wu, Di & Sam, Abdoul G. & Wang, Xiangrui, 2024. "Spillover effects of financial deregulation: The unintended consequences of the OCC preemption rule on mortgage lending practices," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 95(PC).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:48:y:2021:i:c:s1042957320300371. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622875 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.