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Uniformly Bounded Information and Social Choice

  • Donald E. Campbell


    (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)

  • Jerry S. Kelly


    (Department of Economics, Syracuse University)

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    The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive number β such that each pair of alternatives can be socially ordered without having to consult individual preference over a set with more than β alternatives then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial when individual preferences are restricted to a rich subset of profiles.

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    Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 49.

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    Length: 16 pages
    Date of creation: 31 Jan 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:49
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    1. Osborne, Dale K, 1976. "Irrelevant Alternatives and Social Welfare," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(5), pages 1001-15, September.
    2. Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2005. "Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 93-127, 09.
    3. Blau, Julian H, 1971. "Arrow's Theorem with Weak Independence," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 38(152), pages 413-20, November.
    4. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2000. "Information and preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 3-24.
    5. Marc Fleurbaey & Kotaro Suzumura & Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: How much should we know about indifference surfaces?," Post-Print hal-00246987, HAL.
    6. Marc Fleurbaey, 2003. "On the informational basis of social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 347-384, October.
    7. Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2005. "Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills," Post-Print hal-00246989, HAL.
    8. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2002. "Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 35-94 Elsevier.
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