Information and preference aggregation
We investigate the implications of relaxing Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom while retaining transitivity and the Pareto condition. Even a small relaxation opens a floodgate of possibilities for nondictatorial and efficient social choice.
Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: 20 August 1997/Accepted: 29 September 1998|
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|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|
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