Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives
For a finite number of alternatives, in the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition is incompatible with each of anonymity and neutrality (Campbell and Kelly ). This paper explores how those results are affected when there are countably many alternatives.
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- Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2000. "Information and preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(1), pages 3-24.
- Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2006. "Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA," Working Papers 38, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
- Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
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