Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives
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Volume (Year): 29 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2002. "Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 35-94 Elsevier.
- Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2006. "Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives," Working Papers 43, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
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