Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes
Framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinant of election outcomes. This paper uses a two-party setting and simple game theoretic models to analyse the strategic interaction between the parties’ campaign decisions. Alternations of power emerge naturally, even if both electoral preferences and party positions remain constant.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2004|
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