Tax Compliance Policy Reconsidered
Strong empirical evidence suggests that, contrary to standard criminal choice theory, deterrence does not increase tax compliance. A model based on a peculiarity of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in 2-by-2 games is used to explain this observation theoretically: The strategy choice of a player is not affected by the changes in his or her payoffs induced by deterrence. Moreover, as empirical observations show that increased deterrence tends to undermine tax morale under relevant conditions, it follows that tax policy should not so much try to deter but should make an effort to maintain and raise citizens' tax morale.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 15 (1998)
Issue (Month): ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Hamburg|
Phone: 49 40 42838-4457
Fax: 49 40 42838-6329
Web page: http://www.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereiche-einrichtungen/fb03/ise/index.html
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1998:p:27-45. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Matthew Braham)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.