Rural Institutions And Natural Resource Exploitation: The Case Of Irish Commonage
This paper uses an original micro data set, to investigate, the role of a specific rural institutions in determining the grazing regime over a common property resource: Irish Commonage. It is found that the level of communal activity of the shareholders, mismanagement, and the degree of participation or democratic involvement in decision making processes of the committee representing shareholders and the number of people actively using the shares are key variables in explaining grazing impact on the common property resource.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (414) 918-3190
Fax: (414) 276-3349
Web page: http://www.aaea.orgEmail:
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 1997. "Coordination problems in local-level resource management," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 197-210, June.
- Larson, Bruce A. & Bromley, Daniel W., 1990. "Property rights, externalities, and resource degradation : Locating the tragedy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 235-262, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aaea04:20408. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.