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Doron Ravid

Personal Details

First Name:Doron
Middle Name:
Last Name:Ravid
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pra1041
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://doronravid.com/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Chicago

Chicago, Illinois (United States)
http://economics.uchicago.edu/
RePEc:edi:deuchus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid & Denis Shishkin, 2024. "Perfect Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2402.06765, arXiv.org.
  2. Tommaso Denti & Doron Ravid, 2023. "Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention," Papers 2306.09964, arXiv.org.
  3. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid, 2022. "Predicting Choice from Information Costs," Papers 2205.10434, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
  4. Jeffrey Mensch & Doron Ravid, 2022. "Monopoly, Product Quality, and Flexible Learning," Papers 2202.09985, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
  5. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid, 2020. "Pooled Testing for Quarantine Decisions," Working Papers 2020-85, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.

Articles

  1. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid & Denis Shishkin, 2022. "Persuasion via Weak Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(10), pages 2705-2730.
  2. Doron Ravid & Anne-Katrin Roesler & Balázs Szentes, 2022. "Learning before Trading: On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(2), pages 346-387.
  3. Ravid, Doron & Steverson, Kai, 2021. "Bad temptation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
  4. Lipnowski, Elliot & Ravid, Doron, 2021. "Pooled testing for quarantine decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  5. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid, 2020. "Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1631-1660, July.
  6. Doron Ravid, 2020. "Ultimatum Bargaining with Rational Inattention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(9), pages 2948-2963, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid, 2022. "Predicting Choice from Information Costs," Papers 2205.10434, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.

    Cited by:

    1. Mark Whitmeyer & Kun Zhang, 2023. "Redeeming Falsifiability?," Papers 2303.15723, arXiv.org.
    2. Naudé, Wim, 2023. "Artificial Intelligence and the Economics of Decision-Making," IZA Discussion Papers 16000, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

  2. Jeffrey Mensch & Doron Ravid, 2022. "Monopoly, Product Quality, and Flexible Learning," Papers 2202.09985, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022. "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2338, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  3. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid, 2020. "Pooled Testing for Quarantine Decisions," Working Papers 2020-85, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Hu, Ju & Zhou, Zhen, 2022. "Disclosure in epidemics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).

Articles

  1. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid & Denis Shishkin, 2022. "Persuasion via Weak Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(10), pages 2705-2730.

    Cited by:

    1. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    2. Redlicki, Bartosz & Redlicki, Jakub, 2022. "Communication with Costly and Detectable Falsification," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 452-470.
    3. Monte, Daniel & Linhares, Luis Henrique, 2023. "Stealth Startups, Clauses, and Add-ons: A Model of Strategic Obfuscation," MPRA Paper 115926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2023. "Organizing data analytics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120780, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.
    6. Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2023. "Information Design in Cheap Talk," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_470, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    7. Pei, Harry, 2023. "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    8. Zhou, Junya, 2023. "Costly verification and commitment in persuasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1100-1142.

  2. Doron Ravid & Anne-Katrin Roesler & Balázs Szentes, 2022. "Learning before Trading: On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(2), pages 346-387.

    Cited by:

    1. Bartosz Maćkowiak & Filip Matějka & Mirko Wiederholt, 2023. "Rational Inattention: A Review," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03878692, HAL.
    2. Daniel Krähmer, 2024. "The Hold-Up Problem with Flexible Unobservable Investments," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 278, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    3. Brian C. Albrecht & Mark Whitmeyer, 2023. "Comparison Shopping: Learning Before Buying From Duopolists," Papers 2302.06580, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    4. Tommaso Denti & Doron Ravid, 2023. "Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention," Papers 2306.09964, arXiv.org.
    5. Tommaso Denti & Massimo Marinacci & Aldo Rustichini, 2022. "Experimental Cost of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(9), pages 3106-3123, September.
    6. Yeon-Koo Che & Weijie Zhong, 2021. "Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods," Papers 2105.02828, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    7. Mark Whitmeyer & Kun Zhang, 2022. "Costly Evidence and Discretionary Disclosure," Papers 2208.04922, arXiv.org.
    8. Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022. "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-281.
    9. Vasudha Jain & Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Search and Competition with Flexible Investigations," Papers 2104.13159, arXiv.org.
    10. Xiaoxiao Hu & Haoran Lei, 2023. "Information transmission in monopolistic credence goods markets," Papers 2303.13295, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    11. Terstiege, Stefan & Wasser, Cédric, 2023. "Experiments versus distributions of posteriors," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 58-60.
    12. Yang, Kai Hao, 2023. "On the continuity of outcomes in a monopoly market," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).

  3. Lipnowski, Elliot & Ravid, Doron, 2021. "Pooled testing for quarantine decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid, 2020. "Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1631-1660, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Mark Whitmeyer, 2020. "In Simple Communication Games, When Does Ex Ante Fact-Finding Benefit the Receiver?," Papers 2001.09387, arXiv.org.
    2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2020. "Cheap Talk with Coarse Understanding," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-02972755, HAL.
    3. Itai Arieli & Ivan Geffner & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2023. "Resilient Information Aggregation," Papers 2307.05054, arXiv.org.
    4. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2019. "Partial Language Competence," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-01988076, HAL.
    5. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    6. Jan-Henrik Steg & Elshan Garashli & Michael Greinecker & Christoph Kuzmics, 2023. "Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives," Papers 2309.04193, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    7. Itai Arieli & Ronen Gradwohl & Rann Smorodinsky, 2023. "Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk," Papers 2302.00281, arXiv.org.
    8. Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2022. "Informed Information Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 17028, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2021. "Information Design by an Informed Designer," CEPR Discussion Papers 15709, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Jeahan Jung & Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2019. "Cheap Talk by Two Senders in the Presence of Network Externalities," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 35, pages 249-274.
    11. Itai Arieli & Ivan Geffner & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2024. "Receiver-Oriented Cheap Talk Design," Papers 2401.03671, arXiv.org.
    12. Bruno Salcedo, 2019. "Persuading part of an audience," Papers 1903.00129, arXiv.org.
    13. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2023. "Persuasion and Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 18104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    15. Onuchic, Paula & Ray, Debraj, 2023. "Conveying value via categories," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
    16. Boris Knapp, 2021. "Fake Reviews and Naive Consumers," Vienna Economics Papers vie2102, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    17. Juuso Toikka & Akhil Vohra & Rakesh Vohra, 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion: Reduced Form Approach," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    18. Gong, Qiang & Yang, Huanxing, 2021. "Cheap talk about the relevance of multiple aspects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    19. Monte, Daniel & Linhares, Luis Henrique, 2023. "Stealth Startups, Clauses, and Add-ons: A Model of Strategic Obfuscation," MPRA Paper 115926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment," Papers 1811.03579, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    21. Andrew T Little, 2023. "Bayesian explanations for persuasion," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(3), pages 147-181, July.
    22. Harry Pei & Bruno Strulovici, 2021. "Robust Implementation with Costly Information," Papers 2112.06032, arXiv.org.
    23. Nguyen, Anh & Tan, Teck Yong, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion with costly messages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    24. Little, Andrew T., 2022. "Bayesian Explanations for Persuasion," OSF Preprints ygw8e, Center for Open Science.
    25. Daniel Habermacher, 2022. "Authority and Specialization under Informational Interdependence," Working Papers 142, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    26. Yuling Yan & Weijie J. Su & Jianqing Fan, 2023. "The Isotonic Mechanism for Exponential Family Estimation," Papers 2304.11160, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    27. Kuvalekar, Aditya & Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2022. "Goodwill in communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    28. Pedro M. Gardete & Yakov Bart, 2018. "Tailored Cheap Talk: The Effects of Privacy Policy on Ad Content and Market Outcomes," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(5), pages 733-752, September.
    29. Vohra, Akhil & Toikka, Juuso & Vohra, Rakesh, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion: Reduced form approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    30. Ian Ball, 2019. "Scoring Strategic Agents," Papers 1909.01888, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    31. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.
    32. Kai Hao Yang & Alexander K. Zentefis, 2022. "Distributions of Posterior Quantiles and Economic Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2328R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2022.
    33. Xiaoxiao Hu & Haoran Lei, 2023. "Information transmission in monopolistic credence goods markets," Papers 2303.13295, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    34. Paula Onuchic, 2021. "Advisors with Hidden Motives," Papers 2103.07446, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
    35. Andreas Kleiner, 2022. "Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World," Papers 2208.11835, arXiv.org.
    36. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    37. Amir Habibi, 2023. "Communicating Preferences to Improve Recommendations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 394, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    38. Terstiege, Stefan & Wasser, Cédric, 2023. "Experiments versus distributions of posteriors," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 58-60.
    39. Duraj, Jetlir & He, Kevin, 0. "Dynamic information preference and communication with diminishing sensitivity over news," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    40. Xiaoxiao Hu & Haoran Lei, 2022. "The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation," Papers 2208.14829, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    41. Christoph Diehl & Christoph Kuzmics, 2021. "The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-925, December.
    42. Raphael Boleslavsky & Mehdi Shadmehr, 2023. "Signaling With Commitment," Papers 2305.00777, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    43. Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.

  5. Doron Ravid, 2020. "Ultimatum Bargaining with Rational Inattention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(9), pages 2948-2963, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Matveenko, Andrei & Mikhalishchev, Sergei, 2021. "Attentional role of quota implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    2. Federico Echenique & Anqi Li, 2022. "Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelps," Papers 2212.08219, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    3. Bartosz Maćkowiak & Filip Matějka & Mirko Wiederholt, 2023. "Rational Inattention: A Review," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03878692, HAL.
    4. Pak Hung Au & Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Attraction Versus Persuasion," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series 202102, HKUST Center for Economic Policy.
    5. Brian C. Albrecht & Mark Whitmeyer, 2023. "Comparison Shopping: Learning Before Buying From Duopolists," Papers 2302.06580, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    6. Tommaso Denti & Doron Ravid, 2023. "Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention," Papers 2306.09964, arXiv.org.
    7. Tommaso Denti & Massimo Marinacci & Aldo Rustichini, 2022. "Experimental Cost of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(9), pages 3106-3123, September.
    8. Ian Ball & James Bono & Justin Grana & Nicole Immorlica & Brendan Lucier & Aleksandrs Slivkins, 2022. "Content Filtering with Inattentive Information Consumers," Papers 2205.14060, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    9. Tommaso Denti, 2022. "Posterior Separable Cost of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(10), pages 3215-3259, October.
    10. Suresh P. Sethi & Sushil Gupta & Vipin K. Agrawal & Vijay K. Agrawal, 2022. "Nobel laureates’ contributions to and impacts on operations management," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(12), pages 4283-4303, December.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2021-03-01 2022-04-04 2023-07-17 2024-03-25. Author is listed
  2. NEP-DCM: Discrete Choice Models (2) 2022-07-11 2024-03-25. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2023-07-17 2024-03-25. Author is listed
  4. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2022-04-04
  5. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2024-03-25
  6. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2022-04-04
  7. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2022-04-04
  8. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2022-07-11

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