Report NEP-CTA-2024-05-06
This is the archive for NEP-CTA, a report on new working papers in the area of Contract Theory and Applications. Guillem Roig issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-CTA
The following items were announced in this report:
- Marc Claveria-Mayol & Pau Milán, 2024, "Incentive Contracts and Peer Effects in the Workplace," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1439, Sep.
- Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2024, "Unidirectional Incentive Compatibility," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_524, Apr.
- Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2024, "Dynamic Screening with Verifiable Bankruptcy," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_525, Apr.
- Georgiadis, George & Ravid, Doron & Szentes, Balázs, 2024, "Flexible moral hazard problems," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 122548, Mar.
- Daniel Krähmer, 2024, "The hold-up problem with flexible unobservable investments," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_523, Apr.
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