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Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment

Author

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  • Burdea, Valeria
  • Montero, Maria
  • Sefton, Martin

Abstract

We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We investigate the effect of evidence and verification control using three treatments: one where messages are unverifiable, one where the receiver chooses which dimension to verify and one where the sender has this verification control. First, we find that evidence helps the receiver. Second, despite significant differences in behavior across the two verification treatments, receivers' payoffs do not differ significantly across these treatments, suggesting they are not hurt by delegating verification control. We also show that a theoretically optimal receiver commitment strategy identified by Glazer and Rubinstein is close to being an optimal response to senders' observed behavior in both treatments.

Suggested Citation

  • Burdea, Valeria & Montero, Maria & Sefton, Martin, 2023. "Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 113-149.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:113-149
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.011
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    Keywords

    Communication; Partially verifiable messages; Verification control; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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