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The Comparative Statics of Persuasion

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  • Gregorio Curello
  • Ludvig Sinander

Abstract

In the canonical persuasion model, comparative statics has been an open question. We answer it, delineating which shifts of the sender's interim payoff lead her optimally to choose a more informative signal. Our first theorem identifies a coarse notion of 'increased convexity' that we show characterises those shifts of the senders interim payoff that lead her optimally to choose no less informative signals. To strengthen this conclusion to 'more informative' requires further assumptions: our second theorem identifies the necessary and sufficient condition on the sender's interim payoff, which strictly generalises the 'S' shape commonly imposed in the literature. We identify conditions under which increased alignment of interests between sender and receiver lead to comparative statics, and study a number of applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2024. "The Comparative Statics of Persuasion," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_564, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_564
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp564
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John K.-H. Quah & Bruno Strulovici, 2009. "Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(6), pages 1949-1992, November.
    2. Doron Ravid & Anne-Katrin Roesler & Balázs Szentes, 2022. "Learning before Trading: On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(2), pages 346-387.
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    4. Ludvig Sinander, 2022. "The Converse Envelope Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(6), pages 2795-2819, November.
    5. Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim & Fuhito Kojima, 2019. "Weak Monotone Comparative Statics," Papers 1911.06442, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
    6. Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "The converse envelope theorem," Papers 1909.11219, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    7. Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Eldar & Sinem Hidir, 2025. "Political Influence Through Microtargeting," Economics Series Working Papers 1077, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

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