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Promotions and Incentives in Nonprofit and for-Profit Organizations

Author

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  • Jed Devaro
  • Dana Brookshire

Abstract

Using data from the 1992–95 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, an employer survey, the authors document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive promotions in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms. The study also uncovers evidence that wage increases associated with promotion were of comparable magnitudes in the two sectors, as was the potential for within-job wage growth; nonprofits were less likely than for-profits to base promotions on job performance or merit; nonprofits were less likely to use output-contingent incentive contracts to motivate workers; and the observed difference in promotion rates between the nonprofit and for-profit sectors was more pronounced for high-skilled than for low-skilled workers. The authors also propose a theory that potentially explains the broad pattern of evidence they uncover, based on the idea that nonprofit workers are more intrinsically motivated (attracted to their work for reasons transcending material compensation) than are for-profit workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Jed Devaro & Dana Brookshire, 2007. "Promotions and Incentives in Nonprofit and for-Profit Organizations," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 60(3), pages 311-339, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:60:y:2007:i:3:p:311-339
    DOI: 10.1177/001979390706000301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Juan Jose Barrios & Mieke Meurs, 2011. "Governance and Behavior in Nonprofits: Analysis of Uruguayan Health Care Organizations," Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory & Labor-Managed Firms, in: Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms, pages 261-286, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    2. Pawel Mikolajczak, 2021. "What affects employment by NGOs? Counteraction to precarious employment in the Polish non-profit sector in the perspective of COVID-19 pandemic crises," Oeconomia Copernicana, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 12(3), pages 761-788, September.
    3. Mohsen Javdani & Andrew McGee, 2019. "Moving Up or Falling Behind? Gender, Promotions, and Wages in Canada," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 189-228, April.
    4. Joseph Lanfranchi & Mathieu Narcy & Makram Larguem, 2010. "Shedding new light on intrinsic motivation to work: evidence from a discrete choice experiment," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 75-93, February.
    5. Dora Gicheva, 2020. "Occupational Social Value and Returns to Long Hours," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 87(347), pages 682-712, July.
    6. Almeshqab, Fatema & Ustun, Taha Selim, 2019. "Lessons learned from rural electrification initiatives in developing countries: Insights for technical, social, financial and public policy aspects," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 35-53.
    7. Franck Bailly & Karine Chapelle, 2013. "The Training of Jobseekers by Non-profit Organizations: An Analysis Based on Data from the Upper Normandy Region of France," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(4), pages 645-682, November.
    8. John T. Addison & Orgul Demet Ozturk & Si Wang, 2014. "The Role of Gender in Promotion and Pay over a Career," Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(3), pages 280-317.
    9. Addison, John T. & Ozturk, Orgul Demet & Wang, Si, 2012. "Promotion and Wages in Mid-Career: Gender, Unionism, and Sector," IZA Discussion Papers 6873, IZA Network @ LISER.
    10. Mikołajczak, Paweł, 2022. "Determinants of precarious employment in social enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 398-408.
    11. Avner Ben-Ner & Matthew Ellman, 2013. "The contributions of behavioural economics to understanding and advancing the sustainability of worker cooperatives," Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity, European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises, vol. 2(1), pages 75-100, August.
    12. Sarah Kaine & Jenny Green, 2013. "Outing the Silent Partner: Espousing the Economic Values that Operate in Not-For-Profit Organizations," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 118(1), pages 215-225, November.
    13. DeVaro, Jed & Maxwell, Nan & Morita, Hodaka, 2017. "Training and intrinsic motivation in nonprofit and for-profit organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 196-213.
    14. Jindřich Špička & Petr Boukal & Hana Vávrová, 2016. "Discussion about Evaluation of Private Non-profit Success," Ekonomika a Management, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2016(2).
    15. Benoit Dostie & Mohsen Javdani, 2020. "Not for the Profit, But for the Training? Gender Differences in Training in the For‐Profit and Non‐Profit Sectors," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 58(3), pages 644-689, September.

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