Employer Recruitment Strategies and the Labor Market Outcomes of New Hires
The results in this article suggest, among other things, a strong association between recruitment choices and starting wages. The theoretical framework motivating the empirical analysis is a wage-posting game in which firms make wage offers and choose recruitment strategies while recognizing a trade-off between hiring speed and match quality. Introducing this theoretical framework to the recruitment literature, I present new evidence on employers' choices of recruitment methods to answer the questions "How do employer recruitment choices vary by firm and vacancy characteristics and the skill requirements of jobs?" and "How do vacancy duration and starting wages vary with recruitment choices?"(JEL MS1) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 43 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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