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Fetching better deals from creditors: Board busyness, agency relationships and the bank cost of debt

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  • Trinh, Vu Quang
  • Aljughaiman, Abdullah A.
  • Cao, Ngan Duong

Abstract

In a cross-country setting, we document that busy boards of directors (i.e., outside directors with multiple directorships) enhance a bank's financing capacity by lowering its cost of debt, which is consistent with the signalling quality hypothesis. Our analysis further reveals that this negative association is more pronounced in conventional banks than their Islamic counterparts. Possibly owning to the distinctive governance structure and the complexity of the Islamic business model, which requires closer monitoring, Muslim debtholders might depreciate a busy board of directors as it is likely to associate with lower scrutinising effectiveness. Our results provide a positive counterpoint to the negative relationship that exists between busy directors and firm performance, and contributes to understanding the indispensable role busy boards play in debt financing.

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  • Trinh, Vu Quang & Aljughaiman, Abdullah A. & Cao, Ngan Duong, 2020. "Fetching better deals from creditors: Board busyness, agency relationships and the bank cost of debt," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:69:y:2020:i:c:s1057521920301162
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101472
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    Cited by:

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    4. Abdullah A. Aljughaiman & Kaouther E. Chebbi, 2022. "Do Investor Overconfidence and Loss Aversion Drive Saudi Firm Market Performance? The Moderating Effect of Corporate Governance," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(16), pages 1-15, August.
    5. Aljughaiman, Abdullah A. & Cao, Ngan Duong & Trinh, Vu Quang & Albarrak, Mohammed & Vo, Xuan Vinh, 2023. "Does gender diversity affect financial strength differently in conventional and Islamic banks? Evidence from MENA countries," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    6. Trinh, Vu Quang & Kara, Alper & Elnahass, Marwa, 2022. "Dividend payout strategies and bank survival likelihood: A cross-country analysis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    7. Ding, Bin Yan & Wei, Feng, 2023. "Overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee and bank risk-taking: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    8. Nitesh Pandey & Satish Kumar & Corinne Post & John W. Goodell & Rebeca García-Ramos, 2023. "Board gender diversity and firm performance: A complexity theory perspective," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 1289-1320, September.
    9. Vu Quang Trinh & Ngan Duong Cao & Linh Hai Dinh & Hong Ngoc Nguyen, 2021. "Boardroom gender diversity and dividend payout strategies: Effects of mergers deals," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 6014-6035, October.
    10. Quang Trinh, Vu & Elnahass, Marwa & Duong Cao, Ngan, 2021. "The value relevance of bank cash Holdings: The moderating effect of board busyness," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    11. Quang Trinh, Vu & Duong Cao, Ngan & Li, Teng & Elnahass, Marwa, 2023. "Social capital, trust, and bank tail risk: The value of ESG rating and the effects of crisis shocks," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Board busyness; Islamic banks; Conventional banks; Cost of debt;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting

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