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The labor market return to academic fraud

Author

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  • Mavisakalyan, Astghik
  • Meinecke, Juergen

Abstract

Academic fraud by undergraduate students is pervasive, but should it be taken seriously as an economic problem? Our research suggests so. Using a unique data set from the Caucasus, we estimate a large positive effect of academic fraud on the probability of employment. Econometrically, we deal with endogenous selection into academic fraud and possible measurement error in the reporting of academic fraud using partial identification techniques. The findings demonstrate that incentives to commit academic fraud are strong and point towards the potentially damaging consequences of academic fraud in broader settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Mavisakalyan, Astghik & Meinecke, Juergen, 2016. "The labor market return to academic fraud," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 212-230.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:82:y:2016:i:c:p:212-230
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.11.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Berlin, Mitchell & Nini, Gregory P. & Yu, Edison, 2017. "Concentration of Control Rights in Leveraged Loan Syndicates," Working Papers 17-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    2. Mavisakalyan, Astghik & Minasyan, Anna, 2018. "The role of conflict in sex discrimination: The case of missing girls," GLO Discussion Paper Series 217, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    3. repec:eee:ehbiol:v:28:y:2018:i:c:p:38-52 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Astghik Mavisakalyan, 2016. "Looks matter: Attractiveness and employment in the former soviet union," Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre Working Paper series WP1604, Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre (BCEC), Curtin Business School.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Academic fraud; Labor market signaling; Selection on unobservables; Partial identification;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models

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