Reducing informal payments in the health care system: Evidence from a large patient satisfaction survey
Paucity of information on the informal market for health services hampers the governments’ efforts in performing their desirable roles in informing, regulating, mandating, financing and providing health services to their people. Analysis of data from a survey of almost 20,000 patients fills a void in understanding informal payments in the countries in transition. A probability model of informal payments shows that knowledge and information have significant impact on reducing frequency of informal payments. Thus, informing patients, which is the least expensive and intrusive role of the government, could significantly reduce out-of-pocket health care spending.
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