This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Citations for "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies"

by Matsui, Akihiko

For a complete description of this item, click here.
Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. repec:att:wimass:19199923 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Andreas Blume, 1995. "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Game Theory and Information 9504002, EconWPA, revised 29 May 1996. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kris de Jaegher, 2007. "Efficient Communication in the Electronic Mail Game," Working Papers 07-11, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Voorneveld, Mark, 2002. "Preparation and toolkit learning," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 485, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ulrich Berger & Josef Hofbauer, 2004. "Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics," Game Theory and Information 0409002, EconWPA, revised 09 Sep 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. repec:att:wimass:192005 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Kenichi Amaya, 2004. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Pre-Play Communication and Efficiency in Games," Discussion Paper Series 165, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Akihiko Matsui & Daisuke Oyama, 2002. "Rationalizable Foresight Dynamics: Evolution and Rationalizability," Vienna Economics Papers 0302, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Akihiko Matsui & Kiminori Matsuyama, 1991. "An Approach to Equilibrium Selection," Discussion Papers 1065, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. repec:att:wimass:192035 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "A general model of best response adaptation," Game Theory and Information 0303008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  12. Gerard van der Laan & A.F. Tieman, 1996. "Evolutionary Game Theory and the Modelling of Economic Behavior," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 96-172/8, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  13. William H. Sandholm, 1997. "An Evolutionary Approach to Congestion," Discussion Papers 1198, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  14. Ulrich Berger, 2004. "Some Notes on Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Game Theory and Information 0409001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. Asst. Prof. Yong-Gwan Kim, 1994. "An Evolutionary Approach to Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments," Game Theory and Information 9403006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  16. Kenichi Amaya, 2006. "Two-Speed Evolution with Pre-Play Communication and Limited Flexibility," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 310-325, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games," ESE Discussion Papers 53, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Splitting The Baby In Two: How To Solve Solomon'S Dilemma When Agents Are Boundedly Rational," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2009. "Limit Behavior of No-regret Dynamics," Discussion Papers 21, Kyiv School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  20. Viossat, Yannick, 2006. "Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 629, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
  21. Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "Continuous Fictitious Play via Projective Geometry," Game Theory and Information 0303004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  23. Sjaak Hurkens & Karl H. Schlag, 1999. "Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models," Economics Working Papers 387, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  24. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  25. repec:att:wimass:1920221 is not listed on IDEAS
  26. Yannick Viossat, 2004. "Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium," Working Papers hal-00242953_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  27. Ulrich Berger, 2004. "Two More Classes of Games with the Fictitious Play Property," Game Theory and Information 0408003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  28. Bill Sandholm, 2003. "Excess Payoff Dynamics, Potential Dynamics, and Stable Games," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000042, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  29. Kiminori Matsuyama, 1991. "Toward a Theory of International Currency," Discussion Papers 931, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  30. Jorg Oechssler & Karl Schlag, 1997. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example," Game Theory and Information 9704001, EconWPA, revised 11 Apr 1997. [Downloadable!]
  31. Yannick Viossat, 2008. "Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria," Post-Print hal-00360756_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  32. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "Fictitious play in 2xn games," Game Theory and Information 0303009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  33. Roger Lagunoff, 1995. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provisions of public projects," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 100, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  34. Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Efficiency versus risk dominance in an evolutionary model with cheap talk," Discussion Paper 6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  35. Karl H. Schlag, 1994. "When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?," Discussion Paper Serie B 299, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  36. Antonio Cabrales, 1993. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," Economics Working Papers 54, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  37. Reinoud Joosten & Berend Roorda, 2008. "Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2008-11, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group. [Downloadable!]
  38. Antonio Cabrales & Walter Garcia Fontes, 2000. "Estimating Learning Models from Experimental Data," Economics Working Papers 501, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  39. Karl H. Schlag, . "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi- Armed Bandits," ELSE working papers 028, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  40. Andreas Blume, 1996. "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Game Theory and Information 9605004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Did you know? Data contributors to RePEc receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-30.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.