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Preparation and toolkit learning

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  • Voorneveld, Mark

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

A product set of pure strategies is a prep set ("prep" is short for "preparation") if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of strategic games satisfying minor topological conditions. The concept of minimal prep sets is compared with (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria, minimal curb sets, and rationalizability. Additional dynamic motivation for the concept is provided by a model of adaptive play that is shown to settle down in minimal prep sets.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 485.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 04 Jan 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0485

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Keywords: noncooperative games; inertia; status quo bias; adaptive play; procedural rationality;

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  1. Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H., 1996. "The consistency principle for games in strategic form," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-72911, Tilburg University.
  2. Dufwenberg, M. & Norde, H.W. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Tijs, S.H., 2001. "The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-86781, Tilburg University.
  3. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1991. "Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 141-146, June.
  4. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
  5. Peleg, Bezalel & Potters, Jos A M & Tijs, Stef H, 1996. "Minimality of Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games, in Particular for Potential Games," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 81-93, January.
  6. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
  7. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  8. Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1993. "Simple and Inertial Behavior: An Optimizing Decision Model with Imprecise Perceptions," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 87-98, January.
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