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An axiomatization of minimal curb sets

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  • Voorneveld, Mark

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

  • Kets, Willemien

    (Department of Econometrics and Operations Research)

  • Norde, Henk

    (Department of Econometrics and Operations Research)

Abstract

Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; they are axiomatized in this article.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 589.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 04 Mar 2005
Date of revision: 18 Mar 2005
Publication status: Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0589

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Keywords: Minimal curb sets; Consistency;

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References

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  1. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  2. Dufwenberg, Martin & Norde, Henk & Reijnierse, Hans & Tijs, Stef, 1998. "The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory," Working Paper Series 1998:11, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  3. Basu, K. & Weibull, J., 1990. "Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behavior," Papers 62, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  4. Norde, H.W. & Potters, J.A.M. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Vermeulen, D., 1996. "Equilibrium selection and consistency," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-72775, Tilburg University.
  5. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000381, David K. Levine.
  6. Voorneveld, Mark, 2004. "Preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 403-414, August.
  7. Peleg, Bezalel & Potters, Jos A M & Tijs, Stef H, 1996. "Minimality of Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games, in Particular for Potential Games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 81-93, January.
  8. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
  9. S. Gawiejnowicz, 2004. "Book Review," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 523-524, December.
  10. Peleg, Bezalel & Tijs, Stef, 1996. "The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 13-34.
  11. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "Persistent retracts and preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 228-232, April.
  13. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Kets, W. & Voorneveld, M., 2005. "Learning to be Prepared," Discussion Paper 2005-117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Tercieux, Olivier & Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "The cutting power of preparation," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 583, Stockholm School of Economics.
  3. Olivier Tercieux & Mark Voorneveld, 2010. "The cutting power of preparation," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 85-101, February.
  4. GRANDJEAN, Gilles & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2009. "Strongly rational sets for normal-form games," CORE Discussion Papers 2009066, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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