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An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets

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  • Mark Voorneveld

    ()

  • Willemien Kets
  • Henk Norde

Abstract

Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; they are axiomatized in this article.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 153-153

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:1:p:153-153

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References

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  1. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
  2. Norde, H.W. & Potters, J.A.M. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Vermeulen, D., 1996. "Equilibrium selection and consistency," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-72775, Tilburg University.
  3. Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H., 1996. "The consistency principle for games in strategic form," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-72911, Tilburg University.
  4. Dufwenberg, M. & Norde, H. & Reijnierse, H. & Tijs, S., 1998. "The Consistency Principle for Set-Valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory," Papers 1998-11, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
  5. Peleg, Bezalel & Potters, Jos A M & Tijs, Stef H, 1996. "Minimality of Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games, in Particular for Potential Games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 81-93, January.
  6. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1991. "Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 141-146, June.
  7. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  8. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
  10. Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "Persistent retracts and preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 228-232, April.
  11. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
  12. Voorneveld, Mark, 2004. "Preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 403-414, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Grandjean Gilles & Mauleon Ana & Vannetelbosch Vincent, 2009. "Strongly Rational Sets for Normal-Form Games," Research Memorandum 059, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Kets, W. & Voorneveld, M., 2005. "Learning to be Prepared," Discussion Paper 2005-117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Tercieux, O.R.C. & Voorneveld, M., 2005. "The Cutting Power of Preparation," Discussion Paper 2005-94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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