Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Learning to be prepared

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kets, Willemien

    (Department of Econometrics and Operations Research)

  • Voorneveld, Mark

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from recent choices: salience, inertia, the formation of habits, the use of rules of thumb, or the locking in on certain modes of behavior due to learning by doing. This paper provides discrete-time adjustment processes for strategic games in which players display precisely such a bias towards recent choices. In addition, players choose best replies to beliefs supported by observed play in the recent past, in line with much of the literature on learning. These processes eventually settle down in the minimal prep sets of Voorneveld (2004, 2005).

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0590.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 590.

as in new window
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 07 Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0590

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46-(0)8-736 90 00
Fax: +46-(0)8-31 01 57
Email:
Web page: http://www.hhs.se/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: adjustment; learning; minimal prep sets; behavioral bias; salience;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
  2. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1993. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 612-43, August.
  3. Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, 2001. "THE POWER OF SUGGESTION: INERTIA IN 401(k) PARTICIPATION AND SAVINGS BEHAVIOR," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(4), pages 1149-1187, November.
  4. Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1993. "Simple and Inertial Behavior: An Optimizing Decision Model with Imprecise Perceptions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 87-98, January.
  5. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
  6. Crawford, Vincent P & Haller, Hans, 1990. "Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 571-95, May.
  7. Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "Persistent retracts and preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 228-232, April.
  8. Sugden, Robert, 1995. "A Theory of Focal Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 533-50, May.
  9. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
  10. Basu, K. & Weibull, J.W., 1990. "Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behaviour," Papers 479, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  11. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Grossman, Sanford J & Kihlstrom, Richard E & Mirman, Leonard J, 1977. "A Bayesian Approach to the Production of Information and Learning by Doing," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 533-47, October.
  13. Voorneveld, Mark & Kets, Willemien & Norde, Henk, 2005. "An axiomatization of minimal curb sets," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 589, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 18 Mar 2005.
  14. Joosten Reinoud & Peters Hans & Thuijsman Frank, 1995. "Unlearning by Not Doing: Repeated Games with Vanishing Actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 1-7, April.
  15. Tercieux, Olivier & Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "The cutting power of preparation," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 583, Stockholm School of Economics.
  16. Voorneveld, Mark, 2004. "Preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 403-414, August.
  17. Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1995. "The Dynamics and Revealed Preference of Status-Quo Optimality," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 263-82, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Kets, W. & Voorneveld, M., 2007. "Congestion, Equilibrium and Learning: The Minority Game," Discussion Paper 2007-61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2008. "Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics," Discussion Papers 0806, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  3. Tercieux, Olivier & Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "The cutting power of preparation," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 583, Stockholm School of Economics.
  4. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2011. "Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics," Working Papers 451, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  5. GRANDJEAN, Gilles & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2009. "Strongly rational sets for normal-form games," CORE Discussion Papers 2009066, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Olivier Tercieux & Mark Voorneveld, 2010. "The cutting power of preparation," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 85-101, February.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0590. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Helena Lundin).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.