An Evolutionary Approach to Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments

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An Evolutionary Approach to Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments

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Asst. Prof. Yong-Gwan Kim (Economics)

Abstract

This paper provides an evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination games with auction. A set- valued solution concept is defined for a finite population model under the best response evolutionary dynamics and applied to their games. It is shown that our solution concept captures the role of auction as a tacit communication device and predicts the equilibria chosen by players in the real experiments. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C72, C92.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9403006.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 28 Mar 1994
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9403006

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C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
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Cooper, Russell & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1993. "Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1303-16, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Beil Richard O., 1993. "Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 485-504, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Crawford, Vincent P., 1991. "An "evolutionary" interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 25-59, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Vincent P. Crawford, 1990. "An 'Evolutionary' Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 89-28r, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
Akihiko Matsui, 1989. "Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society," Discussion Papers 848, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Swinkels, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants," Papers 9, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Blume, A. & Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1992. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Working Papers 92-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Andreas Blume & Yong-Gwan Kim & Joel Sobel, 1992. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-29, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Blume, A. & Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Working Papers 93-07, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 859-67, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Noeldecke,Georg & Samuelson,Larry, . "An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 228, University of Bonn, Germany.
Other versions:
- Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 245-258, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Yong Gwan Kim & Joel Sobel, 1992. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-01, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
Other versions:
- Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 93-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sobel, Joel, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1181-93, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Vincent Crawford, 1992. "Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-02r, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
Other versions:
- Crawford, Vincent P, 1995. "Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 103-43, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cooper, Russell & De Jong, Douglas V. & Forsythe, Robert & Ross, Thomas W., 1992. "Forward induction in coordination games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 167-172, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-48, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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