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Attractive evolutionary equilibria

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  • Reinoud Joosten
  • Berend Roorda
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    Abstract

    We present attractiveness, a reÂ…nement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain evolutionary dynamics. For instance, each attractive evolutionarily stable strategy is an attractive evolutionarily stable equilibrium for certain barycentric ray-projection dynamics, and vice versa.

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    File URL: ftp://papers.econ.mpg.de/evo/discussionpapers/2011-17.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography in its series Papers on Economics and Evolution with number 2011-17.

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    Length: 26 pages
    Date of creation: 15 Dec 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:esi:evopap:2011-17

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    Keywords: attractive evolutionary equilibria; evolutionary dynamics; evolutionary; dynamic & structural stability;

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