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Abstract

We present attractiveness, a reÂ…nement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain evolutionary dynamics. For instance, each attractive evolutionarily stable strategy is an attractive evolutionarily stable equilibrium for certain barycentric ray-projection dynamics, and vice versa.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group in its series Papers on Economics and Evolution with number 2011-17.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 15 Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:esi:evopap:2011-17

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Related research

Keywords: attractive evolutionary equilibria; evolutionary dynamics; evolutionary; dynamic & structural stability;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
• C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2011-12-19 (All new papers)
• NEP-EVO-2011-12-19 (Evolutionary Economics)
• NEP-GTH-2011-12-19 (Game Theory)

References

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