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Citations for "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal"

by Myerson, Roger B

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Cited by (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.):
  1. Roger B. Myerson, 1983. "Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 582, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Sudhir A. Shah, 2006. "On The Optimal Coordination Of Uninformed Agents By An Informed Principal," Working papers 147, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Magnoli Bocchi, Alessandro, 2008. "Rising growth, declining investment : the puzzle of the Philippines," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4472, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000222, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lucia Quesada, 2003. "Modeling collusion as an informed principal problem," Game Theory and Information 0304002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Steven A. Matthews, 1991. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 950, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  7. Lazear, Edward P., 2003. "Output-Based Pay: Incentives, Retention or Sorting?," IZA Discussion Papers 761, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  8. Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Tan, Guofu & Yilankaya, Okan, 2004. "Ratifiability of Efficient Collusive Mechanisms in Second-Price Auctions with Participation Costs," Micro Theory Working Papers tan-04-04-30-01-35-41, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 09 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Leslie M. Marx & Robert C. Marshall, 2004. "Bidder Collusion," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 108, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  11. Marco Ottaviani, 2000. "The Value of Public Information in Monopoly," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1479, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Hector Chade & Randolph Silvers, . "Informed Principal, Moral Hazard, and the Value of a More Informative Technology," Working Papers 2133302, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Vasconcelos, Luis, 2006. "Contractual signalling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp495, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
  14. Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Working Papers 08-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-01-23-02-48-07, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 27 Jan 2008. [Downloadable!]
  16. Roger B. Myerson, 1985. "Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview," Discussion Papers 658, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  17. Alp E. Atakan, 2006. "Competitive Equilibria in Decentralized Matching with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1437, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  18. Joan E. Ricarti Costa, 1984. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Discussion Papers 595S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  19. Edwin Lai & Raymond Riezman & Ping Wang, 2009. "Outsourcing of innovation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 485-515, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  22. Michela Cella, 2006. "Informed Principal with Correlation," Economics Series Working Papers 261, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  23. Joel Watson, 1999. "Starting Small and Commitment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1217, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  24. Randy Silvers, 2006. "The Value of Symmetric Information in an Agency Model with Moral Hazard: The Ex Ante Case," Economics Series 2006_23, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  25. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  26. Todd R. Kaplan, . "Why Banks Should Keep Secrets," Working papers _005, University of Minnesota, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  27. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "An Introduction to Game Theory," Discussion Papers 623, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  28. Ping Wang & Raymond Riezman, 2008. "Preference Bias and Outsourcing to Market: A Steady-State Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  29. Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2005. "First-mover disadvantage," Discussion Papers 127, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  30. Rolf Tisljar, 2002. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms for an Informed Seller," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse33_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  31. Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment," Working Papers 08-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  32. Roger B. Myerson, 1988. "Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 796, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  33. David Besanko & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Competitive Equilibrium in the Credit Market under Asymmetric Information," Finance 0411045, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  34. Roger B. Myerson, 1986. "Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans," Discussion Papers 691, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  35. Michela Cella, 2005. "Monitoring Subcontracting in a Suppliers` Hierachy," Economics Series Working Papers 233, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  36. Canice Prendergast & Lars Stole, 2001. "Barter, Liquidity and Market Segmentation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  37. Michael Smart, 1996. "Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables," Working Papers msmart-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  38. Gaudeul, Alexia, 2009. "A (micro) course in microeconomic theory for MSc students," MPRA Paper 15388, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  39. Randy Silvers, 2006. "The Value of Information in an Agency Model with Moral Hazard," Economics Series 2006_22, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  40. Randy Silvers, 2006. "The Value of Symmetric Information in an Agency Model with Moral Hazard: The Ex Post Contracting Case," Economics Series 2006_24, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  41. Anton Suvorov & Natalia Tsybuleva, 2008. "Advice by an Informed Intermediary: Can You Trust Your Broker?," Working Papers w0121, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  42. Karine Brisset & Florence Naegelen, 2006. "Why the Reserve Price Should Not Be Kept Secret," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
  43. Rolf Tisljar, 2002. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal - Pure-Strategy Equilibria for a Common Value Model," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  44. Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Discussion Papers 1051, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  45. Edward P. Lazear, 1999. "Output-based Pay: Incentives or Sorting?," NBER Working Papers 7419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-8.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.