Why Banks Should Keep Secrets
AbstractI present an example showing it is sometimes efficient for a bank to commit to a policy that keeps information about its risky assets private. Current practices in banking result in bankers having private information: demand deposits are non-contingent contracts, there are time lags before the public has access to updated balance sheets, and certain items on a bank's balance sheet are marked at book-value rather than market-value. The Savings & Loan failures in the 1980's have led to an increase in banking legislation such as the FIRREA of 1989 and the FDICIA of 1991. These laws affect the release of information about a bank's assets by creating a minimum capital requirement, imposing a new examination standard for banks' assets, and implementing a risk-based insurance scheme.
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Other versions of this item:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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