IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tiu/tiutis/995e0699-a8d9-4a58-a120-e13f014a58e4.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Asset Opacity and Liquidity

Author

Listed:
  • Stenzel, A.
  • Wagner, W.B.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

We present a model that links the opacity of an asset to its liquidity. While low opacity assets are liquid, intermediate levels of opacity provide incentives for investors to acquire private information, causing adverse selection and illiquidity. High opacity, however, benefits liquidity by reducing the value of a unit of private information to investors. The cross-section of bid-ask spreads of U.S. firms is shown to be consistent with this hump-shape relationship between opacity and illiquidity. Our analysis suggests that uniform disclosure standards may be suboptimal; efficient disclosure can instead be achieved through a two-tier standard system or by subsidizing voluntary disclosure.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Stenzel, A. & Wagner, W.B., 2013. "Asset Opacity and Liquidity," Other publications TiSEM 995e0699-a8d9-4a58-a120-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:995e0699-a8d9-4a58-a120-e13f014a58e4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/1556897/2013-066.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fecht, Falko & Wagner, Wolf, 2007. "The marketability of bank assets and managerial rents: implications for financial stability," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2007,12, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    2. Todd Kaplan, 2006. "Why banks should keep secrets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(2), pages 341-357, January.
    3. Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2002. "Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 471-485, March.
    4. Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 2012. "Securitization, Transparency, and Liquidity," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(8), pages 2417-2453.
    5. Bruce Ian Carlin & Shimon Kogan & Richard Lowery, 2013. "Trading Complex Assets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(5), pages 1937-1960, October.
    6. Stenzel, André, 2018. "Security design with interim public information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 113-130.
    7. Donald P. Morgan, 2002. "Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 874-888, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. André Stenzel & Wolf Wagner, 2022. "Opacity, liquidity and disclosure requirements," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(5-6), pages 658-689, May.
    2. Jungherr, Joachim, 2018. "Bank opacity and financial crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 157-176.
    3. Stenzel, André, 2018. "Security design with interim public information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 113-130.
    4. Jones, Jeffrey S. & Lee, Wayne Y. & Yeager, Timothy J., 2013. "Valuation and systemic risk consequences of bank opacity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 693-706.
    5. Hess, Kurt & Feng, Gary, 2007. "Is there market discipline for New Zealand non-bank financial institutions?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 326-340, October.
    6. Wagner, Wolf & Uras, Burak, 2017. "Efficient Lemons," CEPR Discussion Papers 11803, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Hyytinen, Ari & Takalo, Tuomas, 2001. "Preventing Systemic Crises through Bank Transparency," Discussion Papers 776, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    8. Craig H. Furfine, 2014. "Complexity and Loan Performance: Evidence from the Securitization of Commercial Mortgages," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 2(2), pages 154-187.
    9. Timmermann, Allan & Schmidt, Lawrence & , & Wermers, Russ, 2017. "Transparency, Investor Information Acquisition, and Money Market Fund Risk Rebalancing during the 2011-12 Eurozone Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 11895, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2003_025 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Karlo Kauko, 2016. "Does Opaqueness Make Equity Capital Expensive for Banks?," Revista de Economía del Rosario, Universidad del Rosario, vol. 17(2), pages 203-227, February.
    12. Catarina Fernandes & Jorge Farinha & Francisco Vitorino Martins & Cesario Mateus, 2018. "Bank governance and performance: a survey of the literature," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 19(3), pages 236-256, July.
    13. Tito Cordella & Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Robert Marquez, 2018. "Government Guarantees, Transparency, and Bank Risk Taking," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 66(1), pages 116-143, March.
    14. Hyytinen, Ari & Takalo, Tuomas, 2001. "Preventing Systemic Crises through Bank Transparency," Discussion Papers 776, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    15. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2010. "Regulating the Shadow Banking System," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 41(2 (Fall)), pages 261-312.
    16. Vink, Dennis & Nawas, Mike & van Breemen, Vivian, 2021. "Security design and credit rating risk in the CLO market," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    17. Du, Brian & Fung, Scott, 2018. "Directional information effects of options trading: Evidence from the banking industry," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 149-168.
    18. Manganaris, Panayotis & Beccalli, Elena & Dimitropoulos, Panagiotis, 2017. "Bank transparency and the crisis," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 121-137.
    19. Gambacorta, Leonardo & Oliviero, Tommaso & Shin, Hyun Song, 2020. "Low price-to-book ratios and bank dividend payout policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 15615, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Dion Bongaerts & K. J. Martijn Cremers & William N. Goetzmann, 2012. "Tiebreaker: Certification and Multiple Credit Ratings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 113-152, February.
    21. Armstrong, Christopher & Nicoletti, Allison & Zhou, Frank S., 2022. "Executive stock options and systemic risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 256-276.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:995e0699-a8d9-4a58-a120-e13f014a58e4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Richard Broekman (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/about/schools/economics-and-management/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.