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Preventing Systemic Crises through Bank Transparency

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  • Hyytinen, Ari
  • Takalo, Tuomas

Abstract

The banking system is known to be vulnerable to self-fulfilling crises that are caused by depositors’ coordination failure. We show that transparency regulation may prevent certain types of systemic crises by eliminating the possibility of the coordination failure.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy in its series Discussion Papers with number 776.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rif:dpaper:776

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. J-P. Niinimaki, 2011. "Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: Prompt Corrective Action," Discussion Papers 69, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  2. Nicole Allenspach, 2009. "Banking and Transparency: Is More Information Always Better?," Working Papers 2009-11, Swiss National Bank.
  3. J.-P. Niinimäki, 2012. "Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Prompt Corrective Action," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
  4. Nier, Erlend W., 2005. "Bank stability and transparency," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 342-354, April.
  5. Faidon Kalfaoglou & Alexandros Sarris, 2006. "Modeling the Components of Market Discipline," Working Papers 36, Bank of Greece.

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