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Causes of bank suspensions in the panic of 1893

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  • Mark Carlson

Abstract

There are two competing theories explaining bank panics. One argues that panics are driven by real shocks, asymmetric information, and concerns about insolvency. The other theory argues that bank runs are self-fulfilling, driven by illiquidity and the beliefs of depositors. This paper tests predictions of these two theories using information uniquely available for the Crisis of 1893. The results suggest that real economic shocks were important determinants of the location of panics at the national level, however at the local level, both insolvency and illiquidity were important as triggers of bank panics.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series Finance and Economics Discussion Series with number 2002-11.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2002-11

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Keywords: Banks and banking - History ; Bank failures;

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References

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  1. Reuven Glick & Andrew K. Rose, 1998. "Contagion and trade: why are currency crises regional?," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 98-03, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  2. Neil Wallace, 1988. "Another attempt to explain an illiquid banking system: the Diamond and Dybvig model with sequential service taken seriously," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 3-16.
  3. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
  4. Calomiris, Charles W & Mason, Joseph R, 1997. "Contagion and Bank Failures during the Great Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 863-83, December.
  5. Donaldson, R. Glen, 1992. "Sources of panics : Evidence from the weekly data," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 277-305, November.
  6. Kelly, M. & O'Grada, C., 1999. "Market Contagion: Evidence from the Panics of 1854 and 1857," Papers 99/19, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-.
  7. Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, 1991. "The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets and Financial Crises, pages 109-174 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Chari, V V & Jagannathan, Ravi, 1988. " Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 749-61, July.
  9. Wicker,Elmus, 2000. "Banking Panics of the Gilded Age," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521770231, April.
  10. Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June.
  11. Frederic S. Mishkin, 1991. "Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises: A Historical Perspective," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets and Financial Crises, pages 69-108 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Smith, Bruce D, 1991. "Bank Panics, Suspensions, and Geography: Some Notes on the "Contagion of Fear" in Banking," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(2), pages 230-48, April.
  13. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, 1998. "The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 6680, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. V.V. Chari & Ravi Jagannathan, 1984. "Banking Panics," Discussion Papers 618, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. S. Rao Aiyagari, 1988. "Banking panics, information, and rational expectations equilibrium," Working Papers 320, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  16. Engineer, Merwan, 1989. "Bank runs and the suspension of deposit convertibility," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 443-454, November.
  17. Wicker,Elmus, 1996. "The Banking Panics of the Great Depression," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521562614, April.
  18. V.V. Chari, 1989. "Banking without deposit insurance or bank panics: lessons from a model of the U.S. national banking system," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 3-19.
  19. Miron, Jeffrey A, 1986. "Financial Panics, the Seasonality of the Nominal Interest Rate, and theFounding of the Fed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 125-40, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Olivier Darne & Amélie Charles, 2011. "Large shocks in U.S. macroeconomic time series: 1860-1988," Post-Print hal-00771828, HAL.
  2. Yokoyama, Kazuki, 2007. "Too Big to Fail: the Panic of 1927," MPRA Paper 2768, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Mark Carlson & Kris James Mitchener & Gary Richardson, 2010. "Arresting Banking Panics: Fed Liquidity Provision and the Forgotten Panic of 1929," NBER Working Papers 16460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Wilkerson, Chad R., 2013. "Senator Robert Owen of Oklahoma and the Federal Reserve's formative years," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q III, pages 95-117.
  5. Ramírez, Carlos D., 2009. "Bank fragility, "money under the mattress", and long-run growth: US evidence from the "perfect" Panic of 1893," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(12), pages 2185-2198, December.
  6. Scott Fulford & Felipe Schwartzman, 2013. "The credibility of exchange rate pegs and bank distress in historical perspective: lessons from the national banking era," Working Paper 13-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.

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