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Too Big to Fail: the Panic of 1927

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  • Yokoyama, Kazuki
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    Abstract

    This paper measures that the Bank of Japan adopted the too-big-to-fail doctrine against the panic of 1927. The results at this paper imply that supported banks had higher closure risk or occupied key positions in the local loan-markets. And this paper finds that the Bank of Japan bailed out solvent banks if they had political importance.

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    File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2768/
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    File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2829/
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    File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3423/
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2768.

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    Date of creation: 17 Apr 2007
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    Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2768

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    Related research

    Keywords: lender of last resort (LLR); too big to fail; the panic of 1927; bank closure;

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    References

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    1. Mark Carlson, 2002. "Causes of bank suspensions in the panic of 1893," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 2002-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Tetsuji Okazaki & Michiru Sawada & Kazuki Yokoyama, 2003. "Measuring the Extent and Implications of Director Interlocking in the Pre-war Japanese Banking Industry," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo CIRJE-F-241, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    3. Tetsuji Okazaki, 2006. "Micro-aspects of Monetary Policy in Pre-war Japan: Lender of Last Resort and Selection of Banks," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo CIRJE-F-398, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    4. Viral Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2007. "Too many to fail - an analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England 319, Bank of England.
    5. Nier, Erlend & Baumann, Ursel, 2006. "Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 332-361, July.
    6. Miron, Jeffrey A, 1986. "Financial Panics, the Seasonality of the Nominal Interest Rate, and theFounding of the Fed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 125-40, March.
    7. Craig O. Brown & I. Serdar Dinç, 2005. "The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1413-1444, November.
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