Bank Panics, Suspensions, and Geography: Some Notes on the "Contagion of Fear" in Banking
AbstractRecent attempts to understand bank panics tend to emphasize informational asymmetries or the possibilities of multiple equilibria. Such approaches stand in contrast to historical research that emphasizes legal factors influencing the organization of the banking system. This paper constructs a model of a banking system operating under regulations similar to those in effect under the National Banking System and in which information is complete. In all other respect the model resembles that of Douglas W. Diamond and Philip Dybvig (1983). The results indicate that, given the regulatory environment, it would have been surprising if suspensions of convertibility had not recurred periodically. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 29 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Russell Cooper & Joao Ejarque, 1995. "Financial Intermediation and The Great Depression: A Multiple Equilibrium Interpretation," NBER Working Papers 5130, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Carlson, Mark, 2005.
"Causes of bank suspensions in the panic of 1893,"
Explorations in Economic History,
Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 56-80, January.
- Harald Uhlig, 2009.
"A Model of a Systemic Bank Run,"
NBER Working Papers
15072, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Raphael H. Solomon, 2004. "When Bad Things Happen to Good Banks: Contagious Bank Runs and Currency Crises," Working Papers 04-18, Bank of Canada.
- Yang, Hsin-Feng & Liu, Chih-Liang & Chou, Ray Yeutien, 2014. "Interest rate risk propagation: Evidence from the credit crunch," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 242-264.
- William C. Hunter & David Marshall, 1999. "Thoughts on financial derivatives, systematic risk, and central banking: a review of some recent developments," Working Paper Series WP-99-20, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Bougheas, Spiros, 1999. "Contagious bank runs," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 131-146, June.
- Hoag, Christopher, 2005. "Deposit drains on "interest-paying" banks before financial crises," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 567-585, October.
- E.J. Stevens, 1991. "Is there any rationale for reserve requirements?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q III, pages 2-17.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.