Who Panics During Panics? Evidence from a Nineteenth Century Savings Bank
AbstractUsing records of the bank accounts of individual depositors, this paper provides a detailed microeconomic analysis of two nineteenth century banking panics. The panics of 1854 and 1857 were not characterized by an immediate mass panic of depositors and had important time dimensions. We examine depositor behavior using a hazard model. Contagion was the key factor in 1854 but it was not strong enough to create more than a local panic. In contrast, the panic of 1857 began with runs by businessmen and banking sophisticates followed by less informed depositors. Uninformed contagion may have been present, but the evidence suggests that this panic was driven by informational shocks in the face of asymmetric information about the true condition of bank portfolios.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 8856.
Date of creation: Mar 2002
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Note: DAE ME
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-04-15 (All new papers)
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