Why Banks Should Keep Secrets
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References listed on IDEAS
- Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-1797, November.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
KeywordsCONTRACTS ; INFORMATION ; BANKS;
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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