On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships
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Volume (Year): 37 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
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- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1990.
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- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Working papers 494, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz., 1990.
"Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency,"
Economics Working Papers
90-141, University of California at Berkeley.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E & Katz, Michael L, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1735-53, November.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Katz, Michael L., 1990. "Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt1678w3w9, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Beaudry, Paul & Poitevin, Michel, 1993. "Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(4), pages 745-82, July.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Eric Maskin, 1990.
"Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/9579, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Dewatripont, M. & Maskin, E., 1990. "Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 311-321, May.
- Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1991. "Adverse Selection in Dynamic Moral Hazard," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(1), pages 255-75, February.
- Antoni Cunyat, 2004. "The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 455-465, January.
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