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Investitionsbudgetierung und Anreizprobleme: Ist der Groves-Mechanismus nur third-best? Zur Effizienz des Groves-Budgetierungsmechanismus

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  • Hofmann, Christian
  • Pfeiffer, Thomas

Abstract

In jüngerer Zeit werden im Rahmen der Investitionsbudgetierung zunehmend die Bedeutung wahrheitsinduzierender Budgetierungsverfahren wie des Groves-Mechanismus zur Überwindung von Anreizproblemen diskutiert. Charakteristisch für den Groves-Mechanismus ist, dass man bei der Performancemessung neben dem realisierten eigenen Bereichsgewinn auch die geplanten Gewinne der anderen Bereiche berücksichtigt. Mit ihm lassen sich auch bei Anreizproblemen das effiziente Budget festlegen und die effizienten Maßnahmen induzieren (first-best Implementierung). Schwerpunkt der bisherigen Diskussionen zum Groves-Mechanismus ist die Frage, unter welchen Annahmen wie Risikoaversion und Kollusion die first-best Implementierungseigenschaft des Groves-Mechanismus bestehen bleibt. Dass diese Diskussionen zur Implementierungseigenschaft des Groves-Mechanismus regelmäßig zu kurz greifen, ist Gegenstand des vorliegenden Beitrags, bei dem der Groves-Mechanismus erstmals in einem Gesamtkontext mit Anreiz- und Teilnah-mebedingungen analysiert wird. Dadurch wird es möglich, die mit dem Groves-Mechanismus verbundenen Implementierungskosten - die bei den anderen Analysen ausgeblendet werden - zu analysieren. Um die Effizienz des Groves-Mechanismus abschätzen zu können wird auf Basis des Revelationsprinzips ein second-best Mechanismus hergeleitet. Die Analyse dieses Mechanismus zeigt, dass in der second-best Situation ein Abweichen sowohl von den first-best Maßnahmen wie auch den first-best Budgets optimal ist. Hierbei sind die Steuerungsgrößen aufeinander abzustimmen. Nur in Spezialfällen ist es optimal, die first-best Maßnahmen und Budgets zu induzieren. In den meisten Fällen hingegen führt der Groves-Mechanismus zu nicht unerheblichen Effizienzverlusten gegenüber dem second-best Budgetierungsverfahren und ist daher - wenn überhaupt - nur third-best. Ausgewählte komparative Studien vergleichen die Wirkungen der beiden Verfahren und verdeutlichen die zum Teil erheblichen Effizienzvorteile des second-best Budgetierungsmechanismus.

Suggested Citation

  • Hofmann, Christian & Pfeiffer, Thomas, 2001. "Investitionsbudgetierung und Anreizprobleme: Ist der Groves-Mechanismus nur third-best? Zur Effizienz des Groves-Budgetierungsmechanismus," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-249, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    • Handle: RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-249
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    References listed on IDEAS

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