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An incentive scheme for true information providing in Supply Chains

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  • Feldmann, Martin
  • Müller, Stephanie

Abstract

This paper examines the problem of how to establish an incentive scheme to furnish reliable and truthful information in Supply Chains. In the current discussion information is typically assumed to be perfect and Supply Chain Partners are presumed to behave altruistically. In our judgement these assumptions are far from realistic. In consequence we assume that opportunistic behavior can emerge and will be accompanied by incomplete and falsified information. Presenting an incentive scheme, we illustrate how a tendency towards true information providing can be constituted in Supply Chains and will be endorsed in the long run. The most important result of this approach is that a substantial change in the information policy of Supply Chains is brought about and a higher level of quality is obtained.

Suggested Citation

  • Feldmann, Martin & Müller, Stephanie, 2003. "An incentive scheme for true information providing in Supply Chains," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 63-73, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jomega:v:31:y:2003:i:2:p:63-73
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Canavari, Maurizio & Centonze, Roberta & Spadoni, Roberta, 2006. "Traceability as Part of Competitive Strategy in the Fruit Supply Chain," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25639, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. repec:spr:fininn:v:1:y:2015:i:1:d:10.1186_s40854-015-0014-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Li, Suhong & Ragu-Nathan, Bhanu & Ragu-Nathan, T.S. & Subba Rao, S., 2006. "The impact of supply chain management practices on competitive advantage and organizational performance," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 107-124, April.
    4. Roberto Chavez, 2014. "Customer integration, information quality and operational performance: A social capital view," Working Papers 57, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
    5. Kyu Kim, Kyung & Yul Ryoo, Sung & Dug Jung, Myung, 2011. "Inter-organizational information systems visibility in buyer-supplier relationships: The case of telecommunication equipment component manufacturing industry," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 667-676, December.
    6. Danese, Pamela, 2013. "Supplier integration and company performance: A configurational view," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1029-1041.
    7. Wu, Jianghua & Zhai, Xin & Huang, Zhimin, 2008. "Incentives for information sharing in duopoly with capacity constraints," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 963-975, December.
    8. repec:eee:joreco:v:34:y:2017:i:c:p:248-259 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Stålhane, Magnus & Andersson, Henrik & Christiansen, Marielle & Fagerholt, Kjetil, 2014. "Vendor managed inventory in tramp shipping," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 60-72.
    10. Yang, Jie & Wang, Jinjun & Wong, Christina W.Y. & Lai, Kee-Hung, 2008. "Relational stability and alliance performance in supply chain," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 600-608, August.
    11. Qu, Wen Guang & Yang, Zhiyong, 2015. "The effect of uncertainty avoidance and social trust on supply chain collaboration," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(5), pages 911-918.
    12. Egri, Péter & Váncza, József, 2013. "A distributed coordination mechanism for supply networks with asymmetric information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 226(3), pages 452-460.

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