Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives
AbstractIt has been shown by Maskin and Tirole (1990, proposition 11) that with quasi-linear preferences and private values, an informed principal neither gains nor loses if her private information is revealed before contracting takes place. The note shows that this result may not hold when the agent faces countervailing incentives.
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Date of creation: Feb 2007
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Publication status: Published, Economics Letters, 2007, 94, 2, 240-244
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Informed Principal; Countervailing Incentives; Risk Neutrality;
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