IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/reecde/v15y2011i3p177-211.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bidder collusion at first-price auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Giuseppe Lopomo
  • Leslie Marx
  • Peng Sun

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie Marx & Peng Sun, 2011. "Bidder collusion at first-price auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(3), pages 177-211, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:15:y:2011:i:3:p:177-211
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10058-010-0104-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-1797, November.
    2. Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter, 1994. "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 193-220, September.
    3. Wayne-Roy Gayle & Jean Richard, 2008. "Numerical Solutions of Asymmetric, First-Price, Independent Private Values Auctions," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 32(3), pages 245-278, October.
    4. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2004. "Corrigendum to "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions" [J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004) 153-169]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 370-371, February.
    5. Shmuel S. Oren & Michael H. Rothkopf, 1975. "Optimal Bidding in Sequential Auctions," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 23(6), pages 1080-1090, December.
    6. Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M., 2007. "Bidder collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 374-402, March.
    7. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2006. "Private monitoring in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 179-211, November.
    8. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    9. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-599, June.
      • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    10. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2004. "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 153-169, January.
    11. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
    12. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
    13. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2003. "Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 79-105, September.
    14. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1973. "The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 1-30, May.
    15. Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991. "Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November.
    16. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-1239, December.
    17. Martin Pesendorfer, 2000. "A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(3), pages 381-411.
    18. Marc S. Robinson, 1985. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 141-145, Spring.
    19. Dimitri,Nicola & Piga,Gustavo & Spagnolo,Giancarlo (ed.), 2006. "Handbook of Procurement," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521870733.
    20. Lopomo Giuseppe & Marshall Robert C. & Marx Leslie M, 2005. "Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-28, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2017. "First‐Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 107-143, January.
    2. Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015. "Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 125-160, January.
    3. Zhang, Wenzhang, 2022. "Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
    4. Wang, Hong, 2020. "Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 283(3), pages 1124-1135.
    5. Hossain, M.S. & Madlool, N.A. & Rahim, N.A. & Selvaraj, J. & Pandey, A.K. & Khan, Abdul Faheem, 2016. "Role of smart grid in renewable energy: An overview," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1168-1184.
    6. Pacharasut Sujarittanonta & Ajalavat Viriyavipart, 2021. "Deterring collusion with a reserve price: an auction experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 536-557, June.
    7. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro’i, 2017. "Collusion and information revelation in auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 84-102.
    8. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Bribing in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 214-228.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2009. "Optimal collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 565-603, March.
    2. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015. "Bribing in second-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 191-205.
    3. Wang, Hong, 2017. "Information acquisition versus information manipulation in multi-period procurement markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 48-59.
    4. Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M., 2007. "Bidder collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 374-402, March.
    5. Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander, 2011. "Fighting collusion in auctions: An experimental investigation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 84-96, January.
    6. Tan, Guofu & Yilankaya, Okan, 2007. "Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 383-396, May.
    7. Olga Gorelkina, 2014. "Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    8. Olga Gorelkina, 2018. "Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions," Working Papers 20182, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    9. Agranov, Marina & Yariv, Leeat, 2018. "Collusion through communication in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-108.
    10. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/7238 edited by Forges, Françoise.
    11. Che, Yeon-Koo & Condorelli, Daniele & Kim, Jinwoo, 2018. "Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 398-435.
    12. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    13. Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 52-64, September.
    14. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities," MPRA Paper 32164, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Zhang, Wenzhang, 2022. "Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
    16. Nicolas Gruyer, 2005. "Using lotteries in auctions when buyers collude," Economics Working Papers 02, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
    17. Che,Y.-K. & Kim,J., 2004. "Collusion-proof implementation of optimal mechanisms," Working papers 4, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    18. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1714-1725.
    19. Nicolas Gruyer, 2008. "Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...")," Economics Working Papers 06, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
    20. Waehrer, Keith, 1999. "Asymmetric private values auctions with application to joint bidding and mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 437-452, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism design; Cartel; Bidding ring; Linear programming; C61; C72; D44; K21; L41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:15:y:2011:i:3:p:177-211. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.