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Barter, Liquidity and Market Segmentation

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  • Canice Prendergast
  • Lars Stole

Abstract

This paper explores the private and social benefits from barter exchange in a monetized economy. We first prove a no-trade theorem regarding the ability of firms with double-coincidences-of-wants to negotiate improvements in trade among themselves relative to the market outcomes. We then demonstrate that in the presence of liquidity shocks, introducing a non-monetary exchange avoids this limitation and enhances trade by (1) generating liquidity and (2) by segmenting the market place into low-demand and high-demand customers in a manner which is impossible with pure monetary exchange. We provide comparative statics illustrating the importance of each effect and relevant extensions.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2001/wp-cesifo-2001-10/cesifo_wp586.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 586.

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Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_586

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Related research

Keywords: barter; exchange;

References

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  1. Bose, Gautam, 1996. "Bargaining Economies with Patient and Impatient Agents: Equilibria and Intermediation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 149-172, June.
  2. Ellingsen, Tore, 1998. "Payments in Kind," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 244, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 10 Feb 2000.
  3. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Discussion Papers 481, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1987. "Middlemen," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 581-93, August.
  5. Marin, Dalia & Schnitzer, Monika, 1995. "Tying Trade Flows: A Theory of Countertrade with Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1047-64, December.
  6. Williamson, S. & Wright, R., 1991. "Barter and Monetary Exchange Under Private Information," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 9107, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
  7. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November.
  8. Ellingsen, Tore & Stole, Lars A., 1996. "Mandated countertrade as a strategic commitment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 67-84, February.
  9. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John & Whinston, Michael D, 1989. "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 371-83, May.
  10. Morris, Stephen, 1994. "Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1327-47, November.
  11. Hennart, Jean-Francois & Anderson, Erin, 1993. "Countertrade and the Minimization of Transaction Costs: An Empirical Examination," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 290-313, October.
  12. Canice Prendergast & Lars A. Stole, 1996. "Non-Monetary Exchange Within Firms and Industry," NBER Working Papers 5765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Sudipto Bhattacharya and Kathleen Hagerty., 1984. "Dealerships, Trading Externalities, and General Equilibrium," Research Program in Finance Working Papers 143, University of California at Berkeley.
  14. Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, . "Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence," CRSP working papers 322, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  15. Aiyagari, S Rao & Wallace, Neil, 1992. "Fiat Money in the Kiyotaki-Wright Model," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 447-64, October.
  16. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
  17. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August.
  18. Biais, Bruno & Gollier, Christian, 1997. "Trade Credit and Credit Rationing," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(4), pages 903-37.
  19. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Randall Wright, 1989. "A contribution to the pure theory of money," Staff Report 123, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  20. Hennart, J.-F.M.A., 1989. "The transaction cost rationale for countertrade," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-175838, Tilburg University.
  21. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1993. "A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 63-77, March.
  22. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 2000. "Barter relationships," MPRA Paper 33400, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore, 2004. "Credit Chains," ESE Discussion Papers 118, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  24. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 1999. "Restricting the means of exchange within organizations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 1007-1019, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jose Noguera & Susan Linz, 2003. "A Theoretical Model of Barter in Russia," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp207, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  2. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 2000. "Barter relationships," MPRA Paper 33400, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Ellingsen, Tore, 1998. "Payments in Kind," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 244, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 10 Feb 2000.
  4. Marin, Dalia & Schnitzer, Monika, 2005. "Disorganization and financial collapse," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 387-408, February.

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