The transmission mechanism to barter
AbstractThis paper sets up a model to inquire into whether the rise and fall in barter transactions in Russia and other CIS countries during the 1990’s was an involuntary decision resulting from credit rationing or the consequence of firms’ optimal choice. We find that the transmission mechanism of the government policy contains the necessary information to answer the question. An inquiry into the empirics of the model is then conducted using data from Russia.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp243.
Date of creation: Dec 2004
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Barter; Interest rate; Credit rationing; Optimal choice;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E0 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General
- E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
- P24 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - National Income, Product, and Expenditure; Money; Inflation
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-02-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2005-02-01 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-MAC-2005-02-01 (Macroeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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