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Citations of
Y. Stephen Chiu

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics

Working papers

  1. Stephen Chiu, 2002. "Signaling versus Commitment Strengthening: Exchange Rate Insurance against Currency Attacks," Working Papers 202002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Jose De Gregorio & Andrea Tokman R., 2004. "Overcoming Fear of Floating: Exchange Rate Policies in Chile," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 302, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
    2. José De Gregorio & Andrea Tokman & Rodrigo Valdés, 2005. "Tipo de Cambio Flexible con Metas de Inflación en Chile: Experiencia y Temas de Interés," Economic Policy Papers Central Bank of Chile 14, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]


Articles

  1. Chan, Kenneth S. & Chiu, Y. Stephen, 2002. "The role of (non-)transparency in a currency crisis model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 397-416, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Zvika Neeman & Gerhard Oskar Orosel, 2002. "Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
    2. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Aug 2001. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Cukierman, Alex & Goldstein, Itay & Spiegel, Yossi, 2003. "The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime and Speculative Attacks," CEPR Discussion Papers 3714, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    4. M. Sbracia & Alessandro Prati, 2002. "Currency Crises and Uncertainty About Fundamentals," IMF Working Papers 02/3, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Femminis, Gianluca, 2002. "Currency Attacks with Multiple Equilibria and Imperfect Information: The Role of Wage-setters," CEPR Discussion Papers 3291, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Y. Stephen Chiu, 2002. "On the Feasibility of Unpopular Policies under Re-Election Concerns," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 841-858, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Klaas Beniers & Robert Dur, 2007. "Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 29-54, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    2. Frisell, Lars, 2004. "Populism," Working Paper Series 166, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden). [Downloadable!]
    3. Klaas J. Beniers, 2005. "Party Governance and the Selection of Parliamentarians," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-080/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]

  3. Chiu, Y. Stephen & Rachel Yang, B., 1999. "The outside option, threat point, and Nash bargaining solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 181-188, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Kessler, Anke S. & Luelfesmann, Christoph, 2002. "The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Hessel Oosterbeek & Randolph Sloof & Joep Sonnemans, 2007. "Who should invest in specific training?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 329-357, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  4. (*), Y. Stephen Chiu & Ani Dasgupta, 1998. "On implementation via demand commitment games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 161-189. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Implementation of the levels structure value," Game Theory and Information 0303006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    2. Noemí Navarro & Andrés Perea, 2001. "Bargaining In Networks And The Myerson Value," Economics Working Papers we016121, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    3. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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    4. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "A bargaining approach to the consistent value for NTU games with coalition structure," Game Theory and Information 0303001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    5. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2006. "Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: a Generalized Bidding Approach," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2006/06, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
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    6. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2005. "Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a three-agent economy," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 647.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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    7. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Bargaining with commitments," Game Theory and Information 0306002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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    8. Yves Breitmoser, 2009. "Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 183-191, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    9. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2005. "Efficient Bidding with Externalities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 641.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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    10. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2006. "Demand Bargaining and Proportional Payoffs in Legislatures," Discussion Papers 2006-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
    11. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Demand commitment in legislative bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0511005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

  5. Chiu, Y Stephen, 1998. "Noncooperative Bargaining, Hostages, and Optimal Asset Ownership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 882-901, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Vasconcelos, Luis, 2006. "Contractual signalling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp495, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
    2. Christian A. Ruzzier, 2009. "Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration: Williamson’s Hypothesis Reconsidered," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-119, Harvard Business School. [Downloadable!]
    3. Kalyan Chatterjee & Y. Stephen Chiu, 2007. "When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1). [Downloadable!]
    4. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 2008. "A Theory of Firm Scope," NBER Working Papers 14613, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    5. David de Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2004. "Exclusive Contracts Foster Relationship-Specific Investment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/105, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
    6. Susheng Wang & Tian (Tim) Zhu, 2000. "Bargaining, Revenue Sharing and Control Rights Allocation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0373, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    7. Chong-En Bai & Zhigang Tao & Changqi Wu, 2003. "Revenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production: Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures.," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-563, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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    8. Maija Halonen, 2002. "Organizational Design, Technology and the Boundaries of the Firm," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 02/540, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
    9. Eric S Chou, 2003. "The Human Side of Firms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000484, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    10. David de Meza & Marianno Selvaggi, 2003. "Please Hold me Up: Why Firms Grant Exclusive Dealing Contracts," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/066, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
    11. Kalyan Chatterjee & Y. Stephen Chiu, 2000. "When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0518, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    12. Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    13. Thiele, Veikko, 2008. "Firms' Procurement Decisions: Is Input Specificity Always an Argument for Vertical Integration?," MPRA Paper 2471, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    14. Roman Inderst & Christian Wey, 2005. "Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 464, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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    15. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    16. Jiahua Che, 2003. "The Life Cycle of Government Ownership," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-627, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    17. Blonski, Matthias & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2002. "Relational Contracts and Property Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 3460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    18. Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait, 2007. "Staged Financing with a Variable Return," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1). [Downloadable!]
    19. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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    20. Chong-En Bai & Zhigang Tao & Changqi Wu, 2000. "Expropriation and Incentives for Team Production," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0807, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    21. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick Schmitz, 2009. "Signaling an Outside Option," Discussion Papers 281, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    22. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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    23. Matouschek, Niko, 2002. "Information and the Optimal Ownership Structure of Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 3216, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    24. Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Maderner, Nina & Tournas, Yanni, 2000. "Idiosyncratic Investments, Outside Opportunities and the Boundaries of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 2558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    25. David A. Grigorian & Tigran A. Melkonyan, 2008. "Microeconomic Implications of Remittances in an Overlapping Generations Model with Altruism and Self-Interest," IMF Working Papers 08/19, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    26. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999)," MPRA Paper 6973, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    27. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March. [Downloadable!]
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    28. Eric Chou, 2004. "The Boundaries of the Firms as Information Barriers," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 313, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    29. Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics, 2006. "The Hold-up Problem," ESE Discussion Papers 142, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    30. Professor Yong Kim & Univ. Southern California, 2004. "Asset ownership and Asset Values Over Project Lifecycles," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 604, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

  6. Chiu, Stephen & Mansley, Edward C. & Morgan, John, 1998. "Choosing the right battlefield for the war on drugs: an irrelevance result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 107-111, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Sylvaine Poret, 2005. "Structure verticale d'un réseau de distribution de drogues illicites et politique répressive optimale," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(4), pages 391-412. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-20.


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