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On implementation via demand commitment games

Author

Listed:
  • (*), Y. Stephen Chiu

    (Department of Decision Sciences and Managerial Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong)

  • Ani Dasgupta

    (Smeal College of Business Administration, Pennsylvania State University, USA)

Abstract

A simple version of the Demand Commitment Game is shown to implement the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for any n-person characteristic function game. This improves upon previous models devoted to this implementation problem in terms of one or more of the following: a) the range of characteristic function games addressed, b) the simplicity of the underlying noncooperative game (it is a finite horizon game where individuals make demands and form coalitions rather than make comprehensive allocation proposals and c) the general acceptability of the noncooperative equilibrium concept. A complete characterization of an equilibrium strategy generating the Shapley value outcomes is provided. Furthermore, for 3 player games, it is shown that the Demand Commitment Game can implement the core for games which need not be convex but have cores with nonempty interiors.

Suggested Citation

  • (*), Y. Stephen Chiu & Ani Dasgupta, 1998. "On implementation via demand commitment games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 161-189.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:161-189
    Note: Received March 1995/Final version February 1997
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jiawei Li & Tianxiang Cui & Graham Kendall, 2022. "Equilibrium in a Bargaining Game of Two Sellers and Two Buyers," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(15), pages 1-9, July.
    2. Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2011. "Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 395-408, March.
    3. Andrea Caggese & Ander Pérez-Orive, 2017. "Capital Misallocation and Secular Stagnation," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-009, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
    5. Yves Breitmoser, 2009. "Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 183-191, June.
    6. Juan J. Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Bargaining with commitments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(1), pages 129-144, January.
    7. Alfredo Valencia-Toledo & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2020. "A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 65-99, June.
    8. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "A bargaining approach to the consistent value for NTU games with coalition structure," Game Theory and Information 0303001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2007. "Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 847-850, November.
    10. Navarro Noemí & Perea Andres, 2013. "A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-20, May.
    11. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2005. "Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a three-agent economy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(48), pages 1-8.
    12. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2017. "Extensions of the Shapley value for Environments with Externalities," Working Papers 1002, Barcelona School of Economics.
    13. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May.
    14. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2006. "Efficient bidding with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 304-320, November.
    15. Navarro, Noemí & Perea, Andrés, 2001. "Bargaining in networks and the myerson value," UC3M Working papers. Economics we016121, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    16. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Implementation of the Levels Structure Value," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 191-209, July.
    17. Ferenc Forgó & János Fülöp, 2008. "On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 16(4), pages 359-377, December.
    18. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2005:i:48:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS

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