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L'impact des politiques répressives sur l'offre de drogues illicites. Une revue de la littérature théorique

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  • Sylvaine Poret

Abstract

This article reviews the theoretical literature on the effect of the public policies of fight against illicit drugs. The theoretical framework common to the models on this topic associates the two principal characteristics of this question, namely a crime and a market, by joining together the economics of crime and the theory of the industrial organization. We present several works studying the strategic behaviors of drugs players, principally suppliers. The objective of the analyses is to explain the failure of the repressive policies implemented in many countries, whose goal is the reduction of consumption by the supply-side anti-drug policy. Classification JEL : K42, L1.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvaine Poret, 2006. "L'impact des politiques répressives sur l'offre de drogues illicites. Une revue de la littérature théorique," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(5), pages 1065-1091.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_575_1065
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lee, Li Way, 1993. "Would Harassing Drug Users Work?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 939-959, October.
    2. Sylvaine Poret, 2002. "Paradoxical effects of law enforcement policies: the case of the illicit drug market," Post-Print hal-02960430, HAL.
    3. Sheng-Wen Chang & N. Edward Coulson & Ping Wang, 2016. "Optimal Drug Policy in Low-Income Neighborhoods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(5), pages 726-751, October.
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    5. Abdala Mansour & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2006. "Gangs and Crime Deterrence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 315-339, October.
    6. Poret, Sylvaine & Tejedo, Cyril, 2006. "Law enforcement and concentration in illicit drug markets," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 99-114, March.
    7. Jonathan P. Caulkins, 1993. "Zero-Tolerance Policies: Do They Inhibit or Stimulate Illicit Drug Consumption?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 458-476, April.
    8. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 347-347.
    9. Poret, Sylvaine, 2002. "Paradoxical effects of law enforcement policies: the case of the illicit drug market," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 465-493, December.
    10. Eatherly, Billy J, 1974. "Drug-Law Enforcement: Should We Arrest Pushers or Users?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 210-214, Jan.-Feb..
    11. Jeffrey A. Miron & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1995. "The Economic Case against Drug Prohibition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 175-192, Fall.
    12. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy & Michael Grossman, 2004. "The Economic Theory of Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs," NBER Working Papers 10976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Skott, Peter & Thorlund Jepsen, Gunnar, 2002. "Paradoxical effects of drug policy in a model with imperfect competition and switching costs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 335-354, August.
    14. Chiu, Stephen & Mansley, Edward C. & Morgan, John, 1998. "Choosing the right battlefield for the war on drugs: an irrelevance result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 107-111, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Poret, Sylvaine, 2009. "An optimal anti-drug law enforcement policy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 221-228, September.
    2. Slim, Sadri, 2009. "Du refus de vente au don: une explication de la formation du prix par l´affect [From rejection of exchange to gift: regard as an explanation of prices]," MPRA Paper 15317, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Apr 2009.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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