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Asset ownership and Asset Values Over Project Lifecycles

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Author Info
Professor Yong Kim
Univ. Southern California

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Abstract

This paper develops a theory of outside ownership where such an ownership arrangement mitigates an external finance problem. Part of the gains from outside ownership accrue to asset owners which determines the asset value. The theory provides a context to analyze asset ownership and asset values over project lifecycles. When there are adjustment costs in realizing the full gains from outside ownership, (i) assets take time to peak in value, and (ii) the outsiders's share of asset ownership increases gradual

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings with number 604.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:feam04:604

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Related research
Keywords: Asset ownership; Asset value; Project lifecycles; Entry and exit;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
O3 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change

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